Appeal, Leave to Appeal, Leave to Execute Pending Appeal re: Security for Costs

SC59-24 : CHANDRA GOYEL vs MYRAMMAR FARMING (PRIVATE) LIMITED t/a COTTONZIM and OTHERS
Ruled By: MWAYERA JA

Rule 55 of the Supreme Court Rules 2018 provides as follows:“55. Security1. If the judgment appealed from is carried into execution by direction of the court appealed from, security for the costs of appeal shall be as determined by that court and shall not be required under this rule.2. Where ...

HH36-10 : BRANSON MARKETING (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs NATIONAL BLANKETS LIMITED
Ruled By: KUDYA J

The third point raised by counsel for the applicant was that the respondent did not comply with the requirements of Rule 46(5) of the Supreme Court Rules as it did not furnish security for the applicant's costs of appeal within one month of filing the notice of appeal or any ...

HH105-10 : THE CHURCH OF THE PROVINCE OF CENTRAL AFRICA vs THE DIOCESAN TRUSTEES FOR THE DIOCESE OF HARARE
Ruled By: MAVANGIRA J

The final preliminary point raised was that the matter is not urgent as it is made very clear in the judgment SC09-10 that the applicant was put on notice several times from 24 July 2009 on the need to furnish security for costs. After failing to timeously furnish security for costs, the applicant was also advised of the need to seek condonation for such failure and for leave to furnish the security out of time. As the applicant made a deliberate decision not to seek condonation until after its appeal was dismissed the present application cannot be viewed in isolation from the application before the Supreme Court. The inordinate delay by the applicant in making an application for condonation must, therefore, be imputed upon the urgency of the present application. There can, therefore, be no urgency on the facts and in the circumstances of this matter. The case of Kuvarega v Registrar-General and Anor 1998 (1) ZLR 188 (HC) was cited in support of such a finding being made by this court. It was submitted that an issue that has been going on since July 2009 cannot now assume urgency.

Regarding the issue of urgency, the response was that this application would not have been necessary if there was now a valid appeal before the Supreme Court. The appeal would have suspended the orders made by HLATSHWAYO J. This application is necessitated by the fact that the appeal that was noted in the Supreme Court was dismissed. It was also submitted that the applicant has, as is entitled to, made an application in the Supreme Court for condonation of its non-compliance with the Rules and for reinstatement of its appeal. In the meantime, the respondent has already moved to give effect or to enforce HLATSHWAYO J's orders. Thus, if the order sought herein is not granted, and the application in the Supreme Court ultimately succeeds, there would have been irreparable damage caused. It was also submitted that the remarks in the Kuvarega v Registrar General and Anor 1998 (1) ZLR 188 (HC) case are of no application in casu as the delay that the respondent's legal practitioner was referring to is delay that arose consequent upon the respondent filing an application for the dismissal of the appeal in the Supreme Court. Once that application was filed by the respondent the applicant was placed in a position in which all it could do was defend that application, and in the course of that defence invite the court to exercise its discretion, as given by the Rules, to make an order other than an order for dismissal. The applicant could not, in the face of the application for dismissal, insist on tendering costs as that would have bordered on contempt of the court before which the application was. However, the Supreme Court did not then deal with an application for condonation. That is the application now pending before it...,. He also submitted that the respondent's suggestion that the applicant should have applied for the urgent hearing of its application now pending before the Supreme Court does not take the matter any further as that would not have provided the applicant with the protection that it now seeks before this court. He submitted that all the preliminary points must therefore fail.

It would be appropriate for the court to give a brief background to the filing of this urgent application. In case numbers HC4327/08 and 2792/09, the respondent herein filed a court application and an urgent chamber application respectively. The two matters were consolidated and heard together culminating in judgment HH166-09.

The applicant herein noted an appeal against the judgment in the Supreme Court in case SC180/09. The respondent herein filed, in the Supreme Court, an application in terms of Rule 36(1) of the Supreme Court Rules for the dismissal of the appeal. The ground on which the dismissal was sought is recorded in judgment SC09-10 as -

“That the respondent (applicant herein) failed to enter into good and sufficient security for the applicant's (respondent herein) costs of appeal failing agreement to have the amount or nature of the security to be provided determined by the Registrar as required by subrule (2) of Rule 46 and furnish such security within a period of one month from the date of the filing of the notice of appeal as required by subrule (5) of the same rule.”

In that judgment, SC09-10, dated 3 May 2010, the Supreme Court ordered as follows –

“It is ordered that the appeal noted in case SC180/09 be and is hereby dismissed in terms of Rule 36(3) of the Supreme Court Rules with costs on a legal practitioner and client scale.”

On 7 May 2010, the applicant filed, in the Supreme Court, a court application in which it seeks relief in the following terms:

“1. The applicant's failure to comply with the provisions of Rule 46(5) of the Rules of this Honourable Court in respect of Case Number SC180/09 be and is hereby condoned.

2. The appeal in Case Number SC180/09 be and is hereby reinstated.

3. The applicant shall provide security for costs as required by Rule 46 of the Rules of this Honourable Court within five days after the date of this order.”

As already stated above, the instant chamber application was referred to me on 10 May 2010.

SC34-17 : ZIMSLATE QUARTZITE (PRIVATE) LIMITED and ARMINCO INVESTMENTS (PRIVATE) LIMITED and TINASHE CHIMANIKIRE and MOHMED MAHMED vs CENTRAL AFRICAN BUILDING SOCIETY
Ruled By: ZIYAMBI AJA

Rule 34(1) of the Supreme Court Rules provides;“(1) The appellant, unless he has been granted leave to appeal in forma pauperis shall, at the time of the noting of an appeal in terms of Rule 29 or within such period therefrom, not exceeding five days, as the Registrar of the ...

Rule 34(1) of the Supreme Court Rules provides;

“(1) The appellant, unless he has been granted leave to appeal in forma pauperis shall, at the time of the noting of an appeal in terms of Rule 29 or within such period therefrom, not exceeding five days, as the Registrar of the High Court may allow, deposit with the said Registrar the estimated cost of the preparation of the record in the case concerned:

Provided that the Registrar of the High Court may, in lieu of such deposit, accept a written undertaking by the appellant or his legal representative for the payment of such cost immediately after it has been determined.”…,.

Rule 34(5) which read as follows:

“(5) If the appellant fails to comply with the provisions of sub rule (1), or any written undertaking made in terms of the proviso to that sub-rule, the appeal shall be deemed to have lapsed unless a judge grants relief on cause shown.”…,.

While the term 'lapse' would suggest the appeal was “terminated, voided, (or) expired” upon failure to comply with Rule 34(1) with the result that there is no appeal filed, the two words, read together, suggest that lapsing is prevented by the relief granted by the judge. If the correct interpretation is that the appeal shall lapse upon failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 34(1) but a judge may reinstate it, the application for reinstatement would, on the face of it, be procedurally proper in the circumstances but the question remains as to the effect of the lapsing. If the effect is to void or terminate or bring an end to the appeal, then the relief to be sought should be an application for an extension of time within which to appeal. This is because an appeal which has been voided or terminated or which has expired cannot be reinstated since there is no appeal pending and one can only reinstate something which exists. On the other hand, if the lapsing is interpreted to mean that the appeal merely fell into abeyance then it may be reactivated by an order of reinstatement. It is to be noted that the Rule does not speak of reinstatement. It speaks of relief.

Another difficulty presented by the wording of the Rule is this. When does the lapsing take place?

The words 'lapsed unless' appear to convey the meaning that it is the refusal by the Judge to grant relief which gives effect to the lapse and that for as long as there is scope for an application for relief the lapse will not take effect. If that is the correct interpretation, then again an application for reinstatement would be appropriate.

HH36-15 : LEE WAVERLY JOHN vs PRINCIPAL IMMIGRATION OFFICER and CO-MINISTERS OF HOME AFFAIRS
Ruled By: MUSAKWA J

The applicant also raises issue with the respondents' failure to provide security for costs as prescribed in Order 31 Rule 2(b) of the Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules, 1980….,.There was no response, in the opposing affidavit, to the allegation of failure to provide security for costs….,.On the issue of security for ...

The applicant also raises issue with the respondents' failure to provide security for costs as prescribed in Order 31 Rule 2(b) of the Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules, 1980….,.

There was no response, in the opposing affidavit, to the allegation of failure to provide security for costs….,.

On the issue of security for costs, Order 31 Rule 2 of the Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules provides that -

“An appeal shall be noted by –

(a) The delivery of notice; and

(b) Unless the court of appeal otherwise directs, giving security for –

(i) The respondent's costs of appeal to the amount of one hundred dollars;

(ii) The costs of the preparation of a copy of the record to the amount estimated by the Clerk of the Court:

Provided that a clerk of the court may, in his discretion, accept a written undertaking from the appellant to pay for the costs of the preparation of the record.”

The Rules are silent on what happens when an appellant does not furnish security for costs.

It does not follow that where an appellant fails to furnish security for costs, the appeal should be dismissed. In this respect see Order 33 Rule 1 of the Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules which states that -

“Except as is otherwise provided in these Rules, failure to comply with these Rules or with any request made in pursuance thereof shall not be a ground for judgment against the party in default.”

Contrast this provision with Rule 36 of the Rules of the Supreme Court which provides that -

“(1) If an appellant who is required to furnish security for the respondent's costs of appeal fails to furnish such security within the period prescribed in subrule (5) of Rule 46, the respondent may, forthwith, give notice to the appellant that, on the date specified in the notice, being not less than five days after service of the notice, he will apply to a judge for dismissal of the appeal by reason of such failure, and for such other order specified in the notice as he may require.”

In the absence of such a provision in the Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules, it means then that a respondent can apply for an order to compel an appellant to furnish security for costs. In this respect see Order 33 Rule 2 of the Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules which states that:-

“Where any provision of these Rules or any request made in pursuance of any such provision has not been fully complied with, the court may on application, order compliance therewith within a stated time.”

The applicant did not seek an order compelling the respondents to furnish security for costs. Therefore, it would not be competent to strike out a Notice of Appeal on that basis.

View Appeal
HH193-16 : GRANDWELL HOLDINGS PL vs MINISTER OF MINES and ZIMBABWE MINING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and MARANGE RESOURCES PL and ZIMBABWE CONSOLIDATED DIAMOND COMPANY and MBADA DIAMONDS PL and ANOR
Ruled By: MAFUSIRE J

An order for security for costs is one entirely in the discretion of the court. It is a rule of practice not one of substantive law: see Saker Co Ltd v Grainger 1937 AD 223…,.Admittedly, the discretion has to be exercised judiciously not capriciously.

SC72-18 : MEIKLES LIMITED vs WIDEFREE INVESTMENTS (PRIVATE) LIMITED T/A CORE SOLUTIONS
Ruled By: BERE JA

The applicant failed to comply with Rule 12(3) of the Supreme Court Rules, 2018, in that it failed to furnish the Registrar with a receipt confirming payment for the Sheriff's security for costs of service of all notices of set down.The non-compliance with Rule 12(3) led to the applicant's appeal ...

HH212-18 : HOSEA OZIAH NCUBE vs SIMBARASHE MUPINGA
Ruled By: CHAREWA J

This matter emanates from a judgment I granted, with costs, in favour of the applicant on 13 September 2017 in HH614-17 (HC9698/17).

Therein, the applicant had sued the defendant claiming possession of certain piece of land situate in the District of Salisbury called the Remainder of Subdivision B of Marshlands of Delft of Hopley (the Remainder) and payment of the sum of two thousand three hundred and eighty United States Dollars (USD2,380) per month calculated from 10 July 2013.

After a full trial, I granted the applicant the order he sought.

The Facts

The parties entered into an Agreement of Sale sometime in 2005 wherein the applicant sold, and the respondent purchased Stand 694 of subdivision B of Marshlands of Delft of Hopley (Stand 694). It later became evident that, during the sale transaction, the parties had used a wrong map, rather than CG2907, which was duly approved by the Surveyor General on 1 November 2003. As a result, the respondent in fact purchased a road - Stand 694 having become a thoroughfare upon completion of the survey plan by the Surveyor General.

Efforts to rectify the error were unsuccessful, mostly due to the respondent's intransigence, who spurned the offer of a replacement Stand and cash adjustment or a refund of the purchase price. Ultimately, the respondent approached this court for an order compelling the applicant to transfer to him, Stand 694, which was duly done. Case number HC1205/07 and DT502/2011 dated 18 February 2011 being apposite.

Thus, the respondent currently holds title to Stand 694. Unfortunately for him, Stand 694 is a road in accordance with the properly approved subdivision permit and survey diagram, CG2907, aforesaid.

The respondent subsequently obtained an order from this court, authorising the eviction of the applicant from Stand 694 (case number HC6804/11 refers). However, quite contrary to the title he holds and the eviction order he obtained, the respondent went on to evict the applicant from the Remainder using the eviction order granted in respect of Stand 694.

Upon obtaining judgment for the restoration of his possession in HC9698/17 aforesaid, the applicant issued a warrant of execution on 20 September 2017. The warrant of attachment with respect to the monetary portion of my judgment was served on the respondent on 25 September 2017, with eviction scheduled for 28 September 2017.

On 27 September 2017, the respondent noted an appeal against my judgment which effect was to suspend any execution of the judgment. Consequently, the applicant filed, on 5 October 2017, this application for leave to execute pending appeal....,.

The applicant submits that the respondent noted the appeal with no bona fide intention to test the correctness of the judgment of the court a quo, but that the appeal is merely intended to either harass him or buy time...,.

The applicant substantiated his submission that the appeal is not bona fide by the fact that the respondent has not paid any security for costs in respect of the appeal to show his seriousness in the prosecution thereof, nor paid for the preparation of the appeal record.

The respondent argued that he had tendered security for costs, but did not proffer any proof of such tender neither did he indicate the amount of the tender. Further, save to move, from the bar, oral evidence that correspondence from the Supreme Court shows that the appeal is being prosecuted, the respondent neither tendered copies of such correspondence nor made any submissions at all with regard to payment for the preparation of the appeal record.

While, ultimately, the issues of security for costs and costs for the preparation of the appeal record are issues for the Supreme Court to consider and decide, the lack of any proof before me that any efforts have been made to pay them does create the impression that the appeal is not bona fide.

SC64-23 : DOVES FUNERAL ASSURANCE (PVT) LTD vs HARARE MOTORWAY (PVT) LTD and AFRICAN BANKING CORPORATION LTD and BLUE STAR LOGISTICS PL and SHERIFF OF ZIMBABWE and REGISTRAR OF DEEDS
Ruled By: MAKONI JA

This is an opposed chamber application for condonation for non-compliance with rules and reinstatement of an appeal in terms of Rule 70 of the Supreme Court Rules 2018 (the Rules).After hearing submissions from counsel, I dismissed the application, with costs on a legal practitioner-client scale, and indicated that reasons will ...

This is an opposed chamber application for condonation for non-compliance with rules and reinstatement of an appeal in terms of Rule 70 of the Supreme Court Rules 2018 (the Rules).

After hearing submissions from counsel, I dismissed the application, with costs on a legal practitioner-client scale, and indicated that reasons will be furnished in due course. These are they.

BACKGROUND FACTS

The facts relevant for the determination of this matter are that the applicant, after being aggrieved by the decision of the High Court (the court a quo), duly filed a notice of appeal to this Court on 19 October 2022 under case number SC529/22.

In its notice of appeal, the applicant tendered security for the respondents costs of appeal 'in an amount agreed between the parties, failing such agreement, in an amount determined by the registrar'.

The tender was made as a requirement under Rule 55(2) of the Supreme Court Rules.

Pursuant to the tender, and on 26 October 2022, the applicant's legal practitioner wrote to the respective legal practitioners of the respondents seeking an indication as to the amount of security they required respectively. The respondents were given seven days within which to respond.

The respondents legal practitioners responded to the letter.

Messrs Gill Godlonton and Gerrans demanded security in the sum of USD10,000; Messrs Danziger and Partners and Kantor and Immerman demanded security in the sum of ZWL5,500,000.

On 16 November 2022, the applicant's legal practitioner wrote to the respondents legal practitioners, in identical terms, proposing security for costs in the sum of ZWL3,000,000 in respect of each of the respondents.

The respondents legal practitioners rejected the applicant's proposed amount in respect of each of them. However, after further discussions, all parties agreed that the applicant was to pay ZWL5,500,000 in respect of security of costs for each respondent.

The security for costs were eventually paid on 9 November and 1 December 2022, and, by then, the payment was out of time as it was due on 19 October 2022.

The appeal, in SC529/22, was heard in court on 15 May 2022.

The respondents objected, that, the appeal was deemed to have been abandoned and dismissed in terms of Rule 55(6) of the Supreme Court Rules on account of the applicant's failure to pay security for costs within the prescribed time frame of one calendar month.

The objection was upheld, and, consequently, the appeal was struck off the roll resulting in the filing of the present application.

The applicant seeks the following relief;

“The application be and is hereby granted.

1. Applicant's appeal in SC529/22 is reinstated and the registrar of this Court is ordered to re-enrol the matter for hearing.

2. First, second, and third respondents shall pay the costs jointly and severally.”...,.

The consequences of failure to pay security for costs timeously was decisively dealt with in Watermount Estates (Private) Limited v Registrar of the Supreme Court & Ors SC135-21.

SC93-23 : AUGUR INVESTMENTS and DOOREST PROPERTIES vs FAIRCLOT INVESTMENT and THE SHERIFF and THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS
Ruled By: BHUNU JA, CHIWESHE JA and MWAYERA JA

This is an appeal against the whole judgment of the High Court (the court a quo) sitting at Harare, handed down on 9 May 2023, dismissing the first appellant's application for a declaration under case HC5989/19 and granting the first respondent's application to set aside the second respondent's decision to uplift judicial attachment on Stand 654 Pomona Township, under case HC10315/19.

Aggrieved by the decision of the court a quo, the appellants have noted the present appeal.

The Facts

The first respondent obtained an arbitral award against the first appellant in the sum of US$4,800,000 excluding interest. The award was granted on 19 March 2015.

The first appellant appealed the arbitral award, which appeal was dismissed on 11 February 2019.

The award was ultimately registered as an order of the court a quo on 26 June 2019.

A writ of execution was issued by the first respondent leading to the attachment of Stand No.654 Pomona Township held under Deed of Grant No.2884/10 (“the property”).

Thereafter, the first appellant paid the sum of RTGS $4,800,000 as the judgment debt and RTGS $1,078,040=21 as interest thereon.

Following these payments, the second respondent advised the judgment creditors (ie the first respondent) that the debt had been discharged and he was thus proceeding to remove the property from judicial attachment.

He did so through letters to the first respondent dated 21 and 25 November 2019, respectively.

The first respondent protested this move, arguing that the property should not be removed from attachment as the judgment debt had not been extinguished because the amount should be paid at the prevailing inter-bank rate between the US$ and the RTGS, and not at the rate of 1US$ to 1RTGS$.

The second respondent did not heed that advice.

It was then that the first respondent approached the court a quo, under HC10315/19, for an order setting aside the second respondent's decision to remove the property from attachment. It also sought consequential relief.

At the close of submissions, the court a quo found in favour of the first respondent who had sued, under HC10315/19, for the setting aside of the second respondent's decision to remove the property from attachment.

Under HC5989/19 the court a quo dismissed the first appellant's application for a declaration that the judgment debt be extinguished at the rate of 1:1 between the US$ and the RTGS$.

For convenience, the two applications were heard together.

The appellants appeal the decisions of the court a quo on the following grounds:

“GROUNDS OF APPEAL

1. The court a quo erred in failing to hold that the Arbitral Award dated 19 August 2015, granted in favour of the first respondent, constituted a liability affected by the provisions of section 4(1)(d) of Statutory Instrument 33 of 2019 (subsequently section 22 of the Finance Act No.2 of 2019).

2. Concomitantly, the court a quo also erred in determining that the Arbitral Award issued on the 19th of March 2015 only became effectual upon its registration on the 26th of June 2019. At law, an arbitral award constitutes a binding obligation as at the date of its grant and not its registration.

3. With respect, the court a quo also grossly misdirected itself in holding that the first appellant's RTGS payments did not fully discharge its indebtedness to the first respondent in respect of the registered arbitral award dated 19th March 2015. Such payments fully discharged what was lawfully due.

4. The court a quo also erred in determining that the second respondent had acted unlawfully in uplifting the judicial attachment on Stand 654 Pomona held under Deed of Grant 2884/10. The voiding of such uplifting was anomalous at law given that the first appellant had discharged its indebtedness, thereby obviating the continuation of execution.

5. Additionally, the court a quo erred in cancelling 'any and all' transfers effected on Stand 654 Pomona Township in circumstances where the second appellant had received title by operation of an extant Deed of Settlement and court order handed down by the court a quo under HC4528/19.

6. The court a quo also erred in ordering the advertisement and sale in execution of Stand 652 Pomona Township held under Deed of Grant No.2884/10 after the cancellation of all subsequent transfers. Such determination is anomalous, in that, after the aforesaid cancellation of subsequent transfers, the land reverts to being State land, incapable of being sold in execution.”

The appellants seek the following relief:

“1. That, the instant appeal succeeds with costs.

2. That, the order of the court a quo be set aside and be substituted with:

Case No. HC5989/19

(i) The application for a declaration order be and is hereby granted.

(ii) The liability arising from the Arbitral Award dated 19th March 2015, in favour of the first respondent, be and is hereby declared executable in RTGS dollars at the rate of one to one to the United States dollars in accordance with section 4(1)(d) of Statutory Instrument 22 of 2019.

(iii) The first respondent to pay costs of suit.

Case No. HC10315/19

(i) The application is dismissed with costs.”

The grounds of appeal raise only one issue, that is, whether the arbitral award in issue, is subject to the provisions of SI 33 of 2019 in terms of which all assets and obligations denominated in United States dollars immediately before the effective date of 22 February 2019 shall be redeemed at the rate of 1US$ to 1RTGS$.

If that question is answered in the affirmative, then, the appeal should succeed. If not, then, the appeal stands to be dismissed.

PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS

The first respondent raised a number of preliminary objections. The objections have no merit.

(i)...,.

(ii)...,.

(iii)...,.

(iv)...,.

(v)...,.

(vi) Sixthly, it is averred that the second appellant did not pay security for costs. In the same breath, it is conceded, that, the first appellant paid such costs on behalf of the second appellant.

Once that concession is made, the preliminary issue falls by the wayside for it matters not who actually deposits the required sums. It could be the party concerned, a fellow litigant, a friend, or even a well-wisher. Such costs would have been paid.

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Appeal, Leave to Appeal, Leave to Execute Pending Appeal re: Security for Costs

SC59-24 : CHANDRA GOYEL vs MYRAMMAR FARMING (PRIVATE) LIMITED t/a COTTONZIM and OTHERS
Ruled By: MWAYERA JA

HH36-10 : BRANSON MARKETING (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs NATIONAL BLANKETS LIMITED
Ruled By: KUDYA J

HH105-10 : THE CHURCH OF THE PROVINCE OF CENTRAL AFRICA vs THE DIOCESAN TRUSTEES FOR THE DIOCESE OF HARARE
Ruled By: MAVANGIRA J

SC34-17 : ZIMSLATE QUARTZITE (PRIVATE) LIMITED and ARMINCO INVESTMENTS (PRIVATE) LIMITED and TINASHE CHIMANIKIRE and MOHMED MAHMED vs CENTRAL AFRICAN BUILDING SOCIETY
Ruled By: ZIYAMBI AJA

HH36-15 : LEE WAVERLY JOHN vs PRINCIPAL IMMIGRATION OFFICER and CO-MINISTERS OF HOME AFFAIRS
Ruled By: MUSAKWA J

View Appeal
HH193-16 : GRANDWELL HOLDINGS PL vs MINISTER OF MINES and ZIMBABWE MINING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and MARANGE RESOURCES PL and ZIMBABWE CONSOLIDATED DIAMOND COMPANY and MBADA DIAMONDS PL and ANOR
Ruled By: MAFUSIRE J

SC72-18 : MEIKLES LIMITED vs WIDEFREE INVESTMENTS (PRIVATE) LIMITED T/A CORE SOLUTIONS
Ruled By: BERE JA

HH212-18 : HOSEA OZIAH NCUBE vs SIMBARASHE MUPINGA
Ruled By: CHAREWA J

SC64-23 : DOVES FUNERAL ASSURANCE (PVT) LTD vs HARARE MOTORWAY (PVT) LTD and AFRICAN BANKING CORPORATION LTD and BLUE STAR LOGISTICS PL and SHERIFF OF ZIMBABWE and REGISTRAR OF DEEDS
Ruled By: MAKONI JA

SC93-23 : AUGUR INVESTMENTS and DOOREST PROPERTIES vs FAIRCLOT INVESTMENT and THE SHERIFF and THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS
Ruled By: BHUNU JA, CHIWESHE JA and MWAYERA JA

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Law Portal Zimbabwe

Appeal, Leave to Appeal, Leave to Execute Pending Appeal re: Security for Costs

SC59-24 : CHANDRA GOYEL vs MYRAMMAR FARMING (PRIVATE) LIMITED t/a COTTONZIM and OTHERS Ruled By: MWAYERA JA

HH36-10 : BRANSON MARKETING (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs NATIONAL BLANKETS LIMITED Ruled By: KUDYA J

HH105-10 : THE CHURCH OF THE PROVINCE OF CENTRAL AFRICA vs THE DIOCESAN TRUSTEES FOR THE DIOCESE OF HARARE Ruled By: MAVANGIRA J

SC34-17 : ZIMSLATE QUARTZITE (PRIVATE) LIMITED and ARMINCO INVESTMENTS (PRIVATE) LIMITED and TINASHE CHIMANIKIRE and MOHMED MAHMED vs CENTRAL AFRICAN BUILDING SOCIETY Ruled By: ZIYAMBI AJA

HH36-15 : LEE WAVERLY JOHN vs PRINCIPAL IMMIGRATION OFFICER and CO-MINISTERS OF HOME AFFAIRS Ruled By: MUSAKWA J

View Appeal HH193-16 : GRANDWELL HOLDINGS PL vs MINISTER OF MINES and ZIMBABWE MINING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and MARANGE RESOURCES PL and ZIMBABWE CONSOLIDATED DIAMOND COMPANY and MBADA DIAMONDS PL and ANOR Ruled By: MAFUSIRE J

SC72-18 : MEIKLES LIMITED vs WIDEFREE INVESTMENTS (PRIVATE) LIMITED T/A CORE SOLUTIONS Ruled By: BERE JA

HH212-18 : HOSEA OZIAH NCUBE vs SIMBARASHE MUPINGA Ruled By: CHAREWA J

SC64-23 : DOVES FUNERAL ASSURANCE (PVT) LTD vs HARARE MOTORWAY (PVT) LTD and AFRICAN BANKING CORPORATION LTD and BLUE STAR LOGISTICS PL and SHERIFF OF ZIMBABWE and REGISTRAR OF DEEDS Ruled By: MAKONI JA

SC93-23 : AUGUR INVESTMENTS and DOOREST PROPERTIES vs FAIRCLOT INVESTMENT and THE SHERIFF and THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS Ruled By: BHUNU JA, CHIWESHE JA and MWAYERA JA

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Law Portal
Zimbabwe

SC59-24 : CHANDRA GOYEL vs MYRAMMAR FARMING (PRIVATE) LIMITED t/a COTTONZIM and OTHERS
Ruled By: MWAYERA JA

HH36-10 : BRANSON MARKETING (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs NATIONAL BLANKETS LIMITED
Ruled By: KUDYA J

HH105-10 : THE CHURCH OF THE PROVINCE OF CENTRAL AFRICA vs THE DIOCESAN TRUSTEES FOR THE DIOCESE OF HARARE
Ruled By: MAVANGIRA J

SC34-17 : ZIMSLATE QUARTZITE (PRIVATE) LIMITED and ARMINCO INVESTMENTS (PRIVATE) LIMITED and TINASHE CHIMANIKIRE and MOHMED MAHMED vs CENTRAL AFRICAN BUILDING SOCIETY
Ruled By: ZIYAMBI AJA

HH36-15 : LEE WAVERLY JOHN vs PRINCIPAL IMMIGRATION OFFICER and CO-MINISTERS OF HOME AFFAIRS
Ruled By: MUSAKWA J

View Appeal
HH193-16 : GRANDWELL HOLDINGS PL vs MINISTER OF MINES and ZIMBABWE MINING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and MARANGE RESOURCES PL and ZIMBABWE CONSOLIDATED DIAMOND COMPANY and MBADA DIAMONDS PL and ANOR
Ruled By: MAFUSIRE J

SC72-18 : MEIKLES LIMITED vs WIDEFREE INVESTMENTS (PRIVATE) LIMITED T/A CORE SOLUTIONS
Ruled By: BERE JA

HH212-18 : HOSEA OZIAH NCUBE vs SIMBARASHE MUPINGA
Ruled By: CHAREWA J

SC64-23 : DOVES FUNERAL ASSURANCE (PVT) LTD vs HARARE MOTORWAY (PVT) LTD and AFRICAN BANKING CORPORATION LTD and BLUE STAR LOGISTICS PL and SHERIFF OF ZIMBABWE and REGISTRAR OF DEEDS
Ruled By: MAKONI JA

SC93-23 : AUGUR INVESTMENTS and DOOREST PROPERTIES vs FAIRCLOT INVESTMENT and THE SHERIFF and THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS
Ruled By: BHUNU JA, CHIWESHE JA and MWAYERA JA