Appeal, Leave to Appeal re: Approach, Notice of Appeal and the Right of Appeal iro Default Judgment

SC02-17 : GUOXING GONG vs MAYOR LOGISTICS (PRIVATE) LIMITED and THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS
Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, BHUNU JA and UCHENA JA

This is an appeal against the entire judgment of the High Court sitting at Harare which directed cancellation of Deed of Transfer Number 2541/14 issued in the name of the appellant, Guoxing Gong, with costs at the punitive scale of legal practitioner and client.

The order appealed against is couched in the following terms:

“In the result, I make the following order:

1. Deed of Transfer No.2541/16 in the name of Guoxing Gong be and is hereby deemed cancelled and the Registrar of Deeds be and is hereby directed to effect such cancellation.

2. The first respondent shall surrender the said Deed of Transfer to the Registrar of Deeds within 48hrs of service of this order to enable the Registrar of Deeds to endorse such cancellation.

3. The first and second respondent shall bear the costs of this application on a legal practitioner and client scale.”

There is no material dispute of facts as most facts giving rise to the legal disputes on appeal are, by and large, common cause.

The undisputed facts are that, Mathonsi Family Enterprises (Pvt) Ltd, who was the second respondent in the court a quo, is the registered owner of a certain immovable piece of property commonly known as Number 9 Simon Mazorodze Road, being the Remainder of Subdivision B of Delft Hopely.

Mathonsi Family Enterprises wished to subdivide and sell a portion of the property but apparently lacked the financial capacity to effect the necessary subdivision and related costs to facilitate the sale and transfer of the envisaged sub-division.

Eventually, it negotiated and entered into a conditional verbal agreement, sometime in 2010, where the first respondent would finance the whole subdivision process, payment of capital gains tax and related costs to facilitate its purchase of the resultant subdivision.

The verbal agreement culminated in Mathonsi Family Enterprises (Pvt) Ltd making the following resolution on 8 December 2010:

“RESOLVED

1. That, the company applies for the subdivision of the property commonly known as No.9 Simon Mazorodze being the Remainder of subdivision B of Delft of Hopely into two properties.

2. That, Mayor Logistics (Pvt) Ltd be and is hereby authorised to provide assistance and to make all such payments as may be necessary to facilitate the subdivision, all of which will be taken into account when disposing of the subdivision to it.

3. That, once the subdivision is approved, half or the smaller of the two subdivided portions shall be sold to Mayor Logistics (Pvt) Ltd for not more than US$35,000 per acre of the prime portions and at a negotiated lower price for any swampy portions in recognition of assistance in the subdivision process.

4. That, the payment terms be discussed with Mayor Logistics (Pvt) Ltd once the subdivision is approved.

5. That, Cliff Mathonsi be and is hereby authorised to sign any documents and to do all such things as may be necessary, on behalf of the company, to facilitate the subdivision and proposed disposal to Mayor Logistics (Pvt) Ltd.”

According to the first respondent, the parties eventually settled for the price of US$50,000 which is yet to be paid.

The sale was, however, subject to a suspensive condition that it would only come into effect upon the first respondent successfully facilitating the subdivision in terms of the above resolution.

It is common cause, that, the first respondent financed and facilitated the acquisition of the necessary subdivisional permit thereby partially fulfilling its part of the bargain.

Although a draft written agreement was prepared in terms of the verbal agreement and company resolution, Cliff Mathonsi refused to sign the draft on behalf of Mathonsi Family Enterprises (Pvt) Ltd claiming that his father wanted more money than previously agreed.

It is plain that the verbal agreement was lawful and binding.

The intended reduction of the verbal agreement to writing was a mere formality not forming part of the contractual agreement.

It is trite, that, in the absence of any prohibition or agreement to the contrary, a verbal agreement is lawful and binding. This explains why by far the majority of contractual agreements are verbal. There is no legal requirement in our jurisdiction that every contractual agreement be reduced to writing.

Despite the verbal agreement, and the first respondent having partially fulfilled its part of the bargain, Mathonsi Family Enterprises (Pvt) Ltd resold the disputed property, at a higher price, to the appellant, unbeknown to the first respondent, on 4 April 2011.

The above facts clearly establish beyond question, that, Mathonsi Family (Pvt) Ltd sold the same property twice, firstly, to the first respondent, and, secondly, to the appellant.

The court a quo was therefore correct in treating the matter as a double sale dispute. There is absolutely no substance in the appellant's argument to the contrary.

A dispute having arisen, and, in a bid to protect and enforce its contractual rights, the first respondent successfully sued Mathonsi Family Enterprises for specific performance in the High Court, under case number HC218/12, in which it obtained the following default order on 5 June 2012:

“IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. The defendant (Mathonsi Family Enterprises (Pvt) Ltd) be and is hereby directed to transfer Stand 102 Grobbie Township of Subdivision B of Delft of Hopely to the plaintiff (1st respondent) against payment of US$50,000.

2. Should the defendant refuse or neglect or fail to sign the documents facilitating the said transfer, the Deputy Sheriff be and is hereby authorised to sign them in defendant's stead.

3. The defendant shall pay the costs of suit on an attorney and client scale.”

Counsel for the appellant raised the point, that, the above default judgment was unenforceable because it has superannuated at common law through the effluxion of time as it was issued more than three (3) years ago.

He however later abandoned the objection, conceding that superannuation was not in issue as the first respondent was not seeking execution.

In view of that concession, it shall not be necessary to determine that issue.

I now turn to consider the appeal on the merits.

It is trite, that, save in special circumstances, which do not concern us here, no appeal lies to this court against a default judgment which is normally reversed by rescission of judgment or a declaration of nullity.

It therefore follows, that, in the absence of special circumstances, no valid ground of appeal can be laid at the door of this court concerning the propriety or otherwise of a default judgement.

Whether or not there was non-joinder, or any other irregularity, pertaining to the default judgment, that is a complaint to be laid at the court a quo's door and not this court.

There being no special circumstances pleaded in this case, this court will not entertain any argument calculated to impugn the validity of the default judgment at hand.

Despite the appellant's concerted efforts to have the default order reversed, the order is still extant, valid, and binding. That being the case, it is not tainted by any form of illegality or impropriety. It stands on equal footing with any other lawful court order capable of enforcement at the instance of the judgment creditor.

For that reason, in a concerted effort to fortify itself against illicit transfer of the disputed property, the first respondent followed up by placing caveat No. 263/12 on the property on 20 June 2012.

SC67-19 : DANIEL CHINTENGO vs TREDCOR ZIMBABWE (PRIVATE) LIMITED t/a TRENTYRE ZIMBABWE
Ruled By: MALABA CJ, GUVAVA JA and BERE JA

In casu, the appellant`s legal representative was barred from making submissions before the court a quo by virtue of his failure to timeously file heads of argument. As a result, the judgment was granted in default. The question of what is meant by “default” was considered in Katritsis v De Macedo 1966 (1) SA 613 (A)…, as ...

The question of what is meant by “default” was considered in Katritsis v De Macedo 1966 (1) SA 613 (A)…, as follows:

“It is clear from the authorities that the default in regard to a defendant is not confined to his failure to file the necessary documents required by the Rules in opposition to the claim against him, or to appear when the case is called, but comprises also failure to attend Court during the hearing of the matter.”

In the above case, the court, in quoting, VOET, also emphasised that a defendant who is present, but does not make a defence, is deemed to be absent. It held at 618D-E:

“Voet, 2.11.11., makes it even clearer. I quote from Gane's translation:

'Moreover, not only is he who does not attend at all on the day fixed to be accounted a dallier and defaulter, but also he who does indeed attend but does not take in hand the business for the taking in hand of which the day had been appointed. For instance, a plaintiff appears and makes no claim: or a defendant does not challenge the plaintiff's claim when he should do so. He who, though present, makes no defence is surely reckoned in the position of one who is not there; and he who, when called upon, does not plead is deemed to have been futile and is expressly classed as contumacious.'”…,.

It therefore becomes apparent that the appellant, because of his failure to file heads of argument, was not before the court a quo and could not address it. In the circumstances, the court properly entered a default judgment against him.

Having determined that the judgment which was handed down by the court a quo was a default judgment, the question that obtains is whether the appellant could properly appeal against it.

At law, one cannot appeal against a default judgment. Rather, the proper procedure is for the aggrieved party to seek rescission of the judgment.

This position was laid down in Sibanda and Ors v Nkayi Rural District Council 1999 (1) ZLR 32 (S).

In that case, the applicants in an application for rescission of a default judgment sent their legal counsel to appear on the scheduled hearing date, with instructions not to prosecute the application but to seek a postponement. The court turned down the request for postponement and proceeded to dismiss the application. The applicants noted an appeal against that decision. At p 33E-F the court held as follows:

“The present appeal is therefore against the order of 23 May 1997 dismissing the application for rescission of the order made on 8 November 1996.

That order, of 23 May 1997, as I understand it, was effectively a default judgment. The practitioner who appeared for the appellants presented no submissions on the merits. There were no reasons given for judgment. Once the postponement was refused, the appellants were effectively in default. Procedurally, therefore, the appellants should have sought a rescission of the default judgment of 23 May rather than appeal against it.

On this ground alone, the appeal must fail.”

In Zvinavashe v Ndlovu 2006 (2) ZLR 372 (S) the lower court, in granting a default judgment, had proceeded to give reasons thereof. In upholding the nature of the default judgment notwithstanding the reasons given by the court a quo, the Court, per GWAUNZA JA…, held as follows at 375B-C:

“Counsel for the respondent contends, correctly, that a default judgment can only be set aside by a successful application for rescission of the judgment under the rules of the relevant court. The application must be made by the defaulting party himself, as indicated by the expression 'purging his default'. It follows that, in casu, the appellant's default remained un-purged even as the learned judge a quo considered the merits of the matter and gave reasons for his judgment. By virtue of Rule 62, the learned judge a quo could simply have 'absolved' the respondent from the application, that is, dismissed it, as long as he was not considering postponing the application or making any other order. The consideration by the judge a quo of the merits of the case, and the giving of his reasons for judgment, therefore had no effect on the status of the judgment given, which remained that of a default judgment.”

More recently, the position was fortified by BHUNU JA in Guoxing Gong v Mayor Logistics (Pvt) Ltd and Anor SC02-17…, where he re-iterated the position in the following words:

“It is trite that, save in special circumstances which do not concern us here, no appeal lies to this court against a default judgment which is normally reversed by rescission of judgment or a declaration of nullity. It therefore follows that, in the absence of special circumstances, no valid ground of appeal can be laid at the door of this court concerning the propriety or otherwise of a default judgment. Whether or not there was non-joinder or any other irregularity pertaining to the default judgment, that is a complaint to be laid at the court a quo's door and not this court. There being no special circumstances pleaded in this case, this court will not entertain any argument calculated to impugn the validity of the default judgment at hand.”

The reason why an Appellate Court cannot set aside a default judgment on appeal is that the merits of the dispute between the parties will not have been conclusively determined. This is in the sense that the default judgment is susceptible to rescission at the instance of an aggrieved party. An Appellate Court cannot make a pronouncement upon it.

As such, it is for the trial court to make a determination of the dispute as a court of first instance.

In June Chung v Shanique Cunningham [2017] JMCA Civ 22 the Jamaican Court of Appeal, per P WILLIAMS JA, held the following…,:

“[27] Given the main thrust of the submissions made on behalf of the appellant in this regard, it is best to bear in mind the fact that the entering of a default judgment is, in the majority of cases, an administrative process without any real determination of the claim. While the default judgment remains unchallenged or where challenges to it have not been successfully made, it is to be properly considered final on the issues of liability as far as a claimant can then move to have his damages assessed, and the issue of liability cannot then be raised.

[28] The principle which underlies the jurisdiction for setting aside a default judgment has been long established as pronounced in the case of Evans v Bartlam [1937] AC 473. LORD ATKIN at page 480 stated:

'The principle obviously is that, unless and until the court has pronounced a judgment upon the merits or by consent, it is to have the power to revoke the expression of its cohesive power where that has been obtained only by a failure to follow any of the rules of procedure.'”

By parity of reasoning, where a default judgment has not been challenged or has been unsuccessfully challenged, it remains extant and binding. The court seized with the jurisdiction to rescind such a default judgment is the court which granted the judgment.

In casu, it is not in dispute that the appellant subsequently lost the benefit of legal representation and that he made efforts to rescind the default judgment that was granted against him. However, the efforts came to nought and the default judgment, not having been set aside, remained extant.

Having found that the default judgment is extant and that no appeal can lie against it, it was for this reason that the Court found that the appeal was improperly before the Court and consequently struck it off the roll.

SC54-06 : VIGOUR FUYANA vs NTOMBAZA MOYO
Ruled By: CHIDYAUSIKU CJ

Where a default judgment has been granted, the recourse open to an aggrieved party is to apply for rescission of the judgment.

SC11-21 : TENDAI BONDE vs NATIONAL FOODS LTD and LOVEJOY NYANDORO [as Chairman of Appeals Committee] and CHIPO NHETA [as Chairman of Works Council]
Ruled By: GUVAVA JA

This is an application for leave to appeal from a judgment of the Labor Court. The court a quo found no merit in the application for leave to appeal and dismissed it, on the main, that, the draft notice of appeal did not raise questions of law.

The applicant was dissatisfied with the judgment of the court a quo and filed an application for leave in terms of Rule 60 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2018.

BACKGROUND FACTS

The brief background of this application may be summarised as follows:

The applicant was employed by the first respondent as a Stock Quality Analyst. He was charged with misconduct by the first respondent on the basis that he had been found in possession of unauthorised email communication which was between Group Executives. The first respondent was of the view that the applicant's conduct amounted to an act of un-authorised impingement of emails in the organisation. The applicants conduct was aggravated by the fact that the applicant had allegedly shared this information with other persons without the written consent of the first respondent in terms of the first respondent's IT policy.

Following a charge of misconduct, a hearing before the Disciplinary Committee was set down but was postponed on six separate occasions at the request of the applicant. On the final occasion, the Disciplinary Committee proceeded to hear the matter and found the applicant guilty in absentia.

He was subsequently dismissed from employment.

Following the applicant's dismissal, he proceeded to file an appeal with the Appeals Committee in terms of the Disciplinary Code. Again, the applicant did not attend the hearing before the Appeals Committee and the Committee proceeded to dismiss the appeal and to uphold the decision by the Disciplinary Committee.

The applicant appealed to the Labour Court under LC/B/37/2019 before MURASI J on the basis, that, the hearing committee had erred by not finding that he was wrongfully charged. The applicant further averred that the committee had erred in finding that he was in possession of documents whereas the documents, subject to the charge, had been loaded onto his computer following a breach of his password.

The first respondent raised a point in limine to the effect that the appeal was improperly before the court as the applicant had not appeared before the two lower tribunals, which tribunals had issued default judgments against him, and, as such, these decisions could not be appealed against.

The court proceeded to uphold the point in limine and struck the matter off the roll.

The applicant then made an application for condonation of late filing of an application for review and extension of time within which to file an application for review.

The court a quo dismissed the application.

The court found that the applicant failed to give a reasonable explanation for the delay in making a valid application for review, and that, in any event, he lacked prospects of success on review.

The applicant subsequently sought for leave to appeal to this Court under LC/MT/48/20. The applicant argued, that, the court a quo had made material omissions in its findings and that its discretion had been based on wrong principles of law. He also attached his intended Notice of Appeal to the application.

The court a quo dismissed the application on the basis that the applicant's intended grounds of appeal did not raise questions of law as required by the Labour Court Rules.

Undeterred by this dismissal, the applicant launched this application.

SC100-21 : PARKHAM ENTERPRISES (PVT) LTD and NYASHA MOTSI vs ADHESIVE PRODUCTS MANUFACTURES (PVT) LTD and THE MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT N.O.
Ruled By: CHITAKUNYE JA

This is an opposed chamber application for reinstatement of an appeal in terms of Rule 70(2) of the Supreme Court Rules 2018.The intended appeal is against the whole judgment of the High Court sitting at Bulawayo, handed down on 17 December 2020 in case number HC1314/20 judgment number HB12-21.THE FACTSOn ...

This is an opposed chamber application for reinstatement of an appeal in terms of Rule 70(2) of the Supreme Court Rules 2018.

The intended appeal is against the whole judgment of the High Court sitting at Bulawayo, handed down on 17 December 2020 in case number HC1314/20 judgment number HB12-21.

THE FACTS

On 1 March 2016, the first applicant was placed under Provisional Judicial Management. The second applicant was appointed as the Judicial Manager.

On 20 August 2020, the first respondent filed an application for the discharge of the provisional judicial management order.

The application was anchored on the argument, that, four (4) years after the provisional management order was granted, no meaningful progress was made and the first respondent sought the discharge of the order, as it believed the order was a sham designed to shield the first applicant from paying its debts.

The applicants did not file any papers in opposition to the first respondent's application, as a consequence thereof, the applicants were automatically barred and the matter was placed on the unopposed roll.

On the date of hearing of the application, counsel for the applicants appeared in court as counsel for the then respondent. He was informed that the first applicant (as respondent) was barred for failing to file opposing papers.

Instead of applying for the upliftment of the bar, counsel contended that he could still be heard.

The judgment of the court a quo shows, that, despite advice on the existence of the bar, counsel persisted in addressing the court on other issues not related to the bar.

The court a quo proceeded to grant a default judgment.

Aggrieved by the decision, the applicants noted an appeal to the Supreme Court.

Some problems arose, administratively, leading to their appeal being deemed abandoned for failure to pay costs of preparation of the record. When they indicated that they had in fact paid the costs, they were advised to apply for reinstatement of the appeal in terms of the Rules hence this application.

The application is opposed.

In its opposition, the first respondent raised some points in limine. These included;

(i) Firstly, that the intended appeal is incompetent as one cannot appeal against a default judgment.

(ii) Secondly, that the deponent to the first applicant's founding affidavit had no requisite authority, as, at the time he was appointed director of the first applicant, the first applicant was under judicial management, and, so, his appointment was a nullity or tainted with illegality. The same fate befell the person who signed the letter of authority as he was also appointed director when the first applicant was under judicial management.

Counsel for the applicants contended, that, the judgment was not a default judgment but was premised on the fact that he appeared in court and argued his client's case.

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

1. Whether or not the judgment of the court a quo was a default judgment or was a judgment on the merits.

2. Whether the deponent to the founding affidavit, Richard Nyatsoka, had authority to represent the first applicant.

APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS

1. Whether or not the judgment of the court a quo was a default judgement or was a judgment on the merits

It is unfortunate, that, despite the fact that the submissions by the applicants counsel were not supported by the judgment which he demanded from the court a quo in order to decide on the way forward, he persisted with them.

In their letter, to the Deputy Registrar of the High Court, dated 18 December 2020, the applicants legal practitioners sought clarity on the nature of the order by the court a quo. In it they stated, inter alia, that;

“However, in his granting the Application, the Honourable Judge did not indicate whether he was granting on the basis that the 1st respondent was barred or on the basis of the substantive verbal submissions made by both Counsel as to whether the Application should be granted.

The distinction is important as the 1st respondent would like to know the correct step to take hereafter, as, in the case of the former, an Application for Rescission would have to be filed whilst in the case of the latter, then an Appeal must be filed.

May you therefore, as a matter of urgency, clarify with his Lordship which of the two is the position. If it's the latter position, we would be pleased if his Lordship were to provide his written reasons.”…,.

It was clear that the applicants legal practitioners were aware of the options available.

Surprisingly, when the judgment was served on them confirming that the judgment was granted as a default judgment, they persisted with seeking to appeal against a default judgment instead of filing an application for rescission as intimated in their letter of 18 December 2020.

Counsel for the applicants conceded, that, before the court a quo, he was advised that the first applicant was barred for not filing opposing papers. He, in effect, said that despite the extant bar he was, nevertheless, allowed to make submissions on the merits hence his contention that it was not a default judgment.

Counsel's submissions in this regard were without merit.

The judgment of the court a quo, at p1, shows that he was clearly advised of the bar.

Instead of applying for the upliftment of the bar, he took an argumentative stance.

In this regard, the judgment states, that, upon being so advised, counsel was undeterred; he attacked the validity of the service of the application and attacked the competence of the application itself.

It is his persistence, in the face of the bar, that counsel contends made his submissions on the merits acceptable.

A bar is not uplifted by a litigant's persistence in arguing on the merits but by a proper application for the upliftment of the bar in terms of the applicable Rules.

In casu, the applicants counsel chose to ignore the bar to his own peril.

In the latter part of the judgment, the court a quo in fact expressed counsel's conduct as unacceptable - especially after being advised of the bar.

The judge a quo indicated, in no uncertain terms, that the judgment was a default judgment. He said:

“Mr Mazibuko was not applying for the removal of the bar. He was attacking the application. In fact, I found his conduct somehow unacceptable; that, after I had pointed out to him that first respondent was barred and that the application was therefore not opposed, he persisted in argument. After considering a number of factors, I refrained from calling him to order. I take the view that such conduct is a deviation from the normal practice; it is inappropriate and unnecessarily belligerent towards the court, and it serves no useful purpose in litigation.

In the result, in deciding this application for default judgment, I did not factor into the equation Mr Mazibuko's submissions. I concluded that the respondent, having been duly barred in terms of the rules of court, and not having made an application for the upliftment of the bar, the application was unopposed.”

I am of the view that the above makes it clear to all and sundry that the judgment sought to be appealed against is a default judgment.

It is trite, that, one cannot appeal against a default judgment. The procedure to contest a default judgement is to seek its rescission before the appropriate court.

It does not matter that one has issues with the judgment. The fact that a party forced their way into making submissions despite its default or whilst barred does not turn a default judgment into a judgment on the merits.

In Christopher Zvinavashe v Nobuhle Ndlovu SC40-06…, GWAUNZA JA…, aptly stated that:

“Counsel for the respondent contends, correctly, that a default judgment can only be set aside by a successful application for rescission of the judgment under the rules of the relevant court. The application must be made by the defaulting party himself, as indicated by the expression 'purging his default'. It follows that, in casu, the appellants default remained unpurged even as the learned judge a quo considered the merits of the matter and gave reasons for his judgment.”

See Ranvali Trust's Trustees v UDC Limited 1998 (1) ZLR 110; Sibanda & Others v Nkayi RDC 1991 (1) ZLR 32 (SC); Quoxing Gong v Mayor Logistics (Pvt) Limited & Another SC02-17; and Read v Gardner & Another SC70-19.

Counsel for the applicants conceded, that, indeed, the law is clear that one cannot appeal against a default judgment.

The first point in limine is upheld with the finding that the judgment is a default judgment. The purported appeal is therefore a nullity.

This disposes of the matter, and I am of the view, that, it is unnecessary to consider the other point in limine.

COSTS

It is clear from the papers filed of record, and submissions made, that the applicants were alerted of the futility of appealing against a default judgement but for some reason had persisted.

The attitude adopted by their counsel, in the court a quo and in this Court, of seeking to deny the clear and indisputable aspect of default is regrettable. Had counsel accepted wise counsel, in the form of letters from his colleagues, he would have by now adopted the correct procedure to have the default judgment set aside in a proper application.

The first respondent has been put to great expense purely because of the unyielding attitude of the applicants even in the face of clear evidence that this was a default judgment.

It is only proper that costs be awarded on the higher scale as requested by the first respondent.

DISPOSITION

As the purported appeal is a nullity, it follows that there is nothing to reinstate. Consequently, this purported application for reinstatement is improper as one cannot seek to reinstate a nullity.

Accordingly, the matter is hereby struck off the roll with costs on the legal practitioner and client scale.

SC134-21 : OK ZIMBABWE LIMITED vs BENJAMIN TAZVIVINGA
Ruled By: GWAUNZA DCJ, HLATSHWAYO JA and BERE JA

This is an appeal against the default judgment granted by the Labour Court on 2 November 2016.BACKGROUND FACTSThe respondent was employed by the appellant as a till operator. On 30 June 2015, there was a scuffle between the respondent and a customer over an issue of change. A spot check ...

This is an appeal against the default judgment granted by the Labour Court on 2 November 2016.

BACKGROUND FACTS

The respondent was employed by the appellant as a till operator. On 30 June 2015, there was a scuffle between the respondent and a customer over an issue of change. A spot check was conducted and a shortfall of $45 was discovered in the respondent's till. The respondent was asked to write a report of the incident and the shortfall.

In the report, he stated, that, the shortfall was caused by $50 which he had given to a fellow till operator, Nancy Chawanza, who had forgotten to return the money. The respondent also stated, in the report, that, he had served a customer and given him $180 cash back instead of $130. He averred that the customer later returned the $50 after realising the error and he replaced the money in his till without notifying his supervisors.

The respondent was subsequently charged with the offence of deliberately giving untrue or incorrect information and for unsatisfactory work performance.

A disciplinary hearing was conducted, and he was found guilty, and was subsequently dismissed.

He appealed against the decision to the Local Joint Committee which upheld the determination and the dismissal. Aggrieved, the respondent appealed to the National Employment Council for the Commercial Sections (NEC) which upheld the determination and dismissed the appeal.

As a result, the respondent noted an appeal with the Labour Court on 1 June 2016.

The appellant failed to file a notice of response at the Labour Court within the stipulated time, only to attempt to do so some four (4) months later, on 18 October 2016, together with heads of argument. This was so despite the appellant having been favoured with a letter from the Registrar of the Labour Court calling on it to file a response.

At the hearing of the matter, the court a quo proceeded in terms of Rule 22(b)(1) of the Labour Court Rules, 2006 (SI59 of 2006) (heinafter referred to as “the Rules”) and entered default judgement against the appellant.

Aggrieved by the decision of the court a quo, the appellant noted an appeal to this Court on the following grounds:

(a) The court a quo erred, on a question of law, by proceeding to enter default judgment against the appellant in circumstances in which the appellant had filed a notice of response, albeit belatedly, as well as heads of argument which would have enabled the court to determine the matter on the merits.

(b) The court a quo erred, on a question of law, by failing to find, that, the explanation which was given by the appellant for the delay in filing the Notice of Response constituted good cause for the delay.

(c) The court a quo made an error, on a question of law, by not taking into account the nature of the case and failing to apply its discretion judiciously, more specially by not considering the evidence on record which demonstrated that the respondent had admitted to the offences with which he was charged, which offences attracted a penalty of dismissal.

(d) The court a quo, in any event, erred, on a question of law, by failing to give reasons for the judgment which is appealed against. A failure to give reasons constitutes a judicial irregularity.

SUBMISSIONS BEFORE THIS COURT

At the hearing of the appeal, counsel for the appellant argued, that, the court a quo erred in not providing reasons for its decision, which was that of the default judgment.

Per contra, counsel for the respondent submitted, that, since what was being appealed against was a default judgement, it could only be set aside through an application for rescission of that judgment.

He further submitted, that, the appellant had not requested the reasons from the Labour Court.

APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS

After hearing submissions, my view is that the sole issue to be determined is whether the default judgment entered by the court a quo is appealable.

The respondent filed its notice of appeal to the Labour Court on 1 June 2016. In terms of the Labour Court Rules, 2006, the appellant had 14 days within which it could file its notice of response.

Rule 19(2) of the Labour Court Rules, 2006 provides as follows:

“(2) The registrar, shall, within thirty days of receiving a notice of appeal in terms of subrule (1)(d), give notice in Part I of Form LC2 to the respondent —

(a) To complete, in three copies, a notice of response to the appeal in Part II of Form LC2; and

(b) To do the following within fourteen days of the date when the registrar gives notice to the respondent under this subrule —

(i) Serve one copy of the notice of response on the appellant: and

(ii) File with the registrar one of the other copies of the notice of response, together with proof (as required by Rule 11) that the notice of response was served on the appellant….,.”

The appellant failed to adhere to the Rules of the court, and it later filed its notice of response and heads of argument way out of time - some four (4) months after the Registrar had given the appellant notice.

There is no evidence on record that an application for condonation for late filing of the notice of response and heads of arguments was made.

It therefore follows, that, the court a quo granted a default judgment in terms of Rule 22(b)(1) of the Labour Court Rules which provides as follows:

“22 Where a party fails to file a Notice of Response

Where notice has been given to a party to file a notice of response within the period specified in Rule 14, 15 or 16 and that party fails to comply, the matter shall nevertheless be set down in terms of Rule 21, and if, on the day of hearing, the defaulting party —

(a)…,.

(b) Does not appear or show good cause why he or she did not file a response, the Court may, according to the nature of the case, or as the justice of the case requires —

(i) Enter a default judgement against the defaulting party;”

A reading of the above provisions will show, that, a respondent who has been served with a notice to respond by the Registrar must file its notice of response within 14 days and serve both the appellant and the Registrar.

Failure to act in terms of the above Rules of court results in the offending party being barred and default judgment entered against him at the discretion of the court.

In casu, the appellant, in the court a quo, was barred from making submissions as it had filed its notice of response out of time - which fact the appellant admitted in its heads of argument. It therefore followed that judgment was granted in default.

The court, in Katritsis v De Macedo 1966 (1) SA 613 (A), held that:

“It is clear from the authorities that the default in regard to a defendant is not confined to his failure to file the necessary documents required by the Rules in opposition to the claim against him, or to appear when the case is called, but, comprises also failure to attend Court during the hearing of the matter.”

As the judgment that was given by the court a quo was a default judgment in nature, the question that ought to be asked is: whether one can appeal on the merits before the bar has been lifted.

According to our law, a party cannot appeal against a default judgment.

The correct procedure would be for that party to make an application for the judgment to be rescinded first: see Chintengo v Tredcor & Anor SC67-19.

This approach was underlined by this Court in Sibanda and Ors v Nkayi Rural District Council 1999 (1) ZLR 32 (S) where it held as follows:

“The present appeal is therefore against the order of 23 May 1997 dismissing the application for rescission of the order made on 8 November 1996. That order of 23 May 1997, as I understand it, was effectively a default judgment. The practitioner who appeared for the appellants presented no submissions on the merits. There were no reasons given for judgment. Once the postponement was refused, the appellants were effectively in default. Procedurally, therefore, the appellants should have sought a rescission of the default judgment of 23 May, rather than appeal against it. On this ground alone, the appeal must fail.”…,.

In Zvinavashe v Ndlovu SC 2006 (2) ZLR 372 (S) it was held:

“The defining feature of a judgement granted after a party fails to appear is the default of the absent party…; that decision remained a default judgment whose setting aside could only follow a successful application for its rescission.”

This Court, again, had the occasion to deal with a similar matter in Guoxing Gong v Mayor Logistics (Pvt) Ltd and Anor SC02-17 wherein BHUNU JA held as follows:

“It is trite, that, save in special circumstances which do not concern us here, no appeal lies to this Court against a default judgment which is normally reversed by rescission of judgment or a declaration of nullity. It therefore follows, that, in the absence of special circumstances, no valid ground of appeal can be laid at the door of this Court concerning the propriety or otherwise of a default judgment. Whether or not there was non-joinder or any other irregularity pertaining to the default judgment, that is a complaint to be laid at the court a quo's door and not this Court.”

The appellant has invited this Court to deal with the merits of this matter as it is seized with all the material facts it needs to make a decision. He relies on the case of Madza & Ors v The Reformed Church in Zimbabwe Daisyfield Trust & Ors SC71-14 wherein ZIYAMBI JA held as follows:

“This court is always reluctant to decide matters at first and last instance although it is quite possible that it may do so in exceptional circumstances.”

Unfortunately, this case does not fall into the category of 'exceptional circumstances' as referenced above.

There is nothing exceptional in the circumstances, but, rather, what is there is a disregard of proper practice and procedure that a default judgment can only be set aside by its rescission. It follows, that, as this is not one of the exceptional circumstances, this Court cannot be moved to hearing this matter in the first and last instance: see Bakari v Total Zimbabwe (Private) Limited SC21-19.

DISPOSITION

The appellant, having had default judgment entered against it, and having not taken steps to have it rescinded, that default judgment remains extant. No appeal can lie against it.

The present purported appeal is improperly before this Court, and, it is, accordingly, struck off the roll with costs following the outcome.

CC07-23 : RITA MBATHA vs VINCENT NCUBE and MESSENGER OF COURT
Ruled By: PATEL JCC

This is a chamber application for condonation and extension of time within which to file an application for direct access due to non–compliance with Rule 9(7) of the Rules of this Court. The instant application was made in terms of Rule 35 of the Constitutional Court Rules 2016.The BackgroundThe applicant ...

The Background

The applicant in this matter is a self-actress seeking the indulgence of this Court to be granted condonation for non-compliance with the Rules.

On 29 March 2023, her application for direct access to this Court, under Case No. CCZ55/22, was struck off the roll due to her failure to effect proper service on the first respondent. The application was one of many suits between the applicant and the first respondent who have been deadlocked in protracted litigation since 2016 when the latter sought to evict the former from his property.

The dispute between the parties appeared to have reached finality when the Supreme Court, in Case No. SC443/21, dismissed the applicant's appeal in which she had challenged the court a quo's dismissal of her urgent chamber application for an interdict meant to bar the first respondent from effecting eviction in terms of the ejectment order granted in his favour under Case No. MC39520/16.

However, the applicant was dissatisfied with the verdict rendered by the Supreme Court, taking particular issue with the utilisation of Rule 53(3) of the Supreme Court Rules 2018.

It was on the basis of the aforementioned Rule that the matter was determined on the merits, having regard to the papers filed of record following the applicant's default of appearance before the Supreme Court.

The dismissal of the appeal culminated in the applicant filing an application for rescission which was subsequently dismissed by the Supreme Court.

Aggrieved by this turn of events, the applicant sought to challenge the final verdict of the Supreme Court before this forum arguing that her fundamental right to a fair trial had been unduly violated.

However, it was due to the earlier-mentioned defective manner of service that the applicant found herself seeking this Court's indulgence to file a proper application for direct access.

In her founding affidavit, the applicant proceeded to narrate the background of her prospective application before this Court. She made unsubstantiated allegations of professional impropriety against the Registrar of this Court which suggested that there was collusion with the first respondent.

There was no explanation tendered for her non–compliance with the Rules of this Court save to insist upon vindicating her allegedly impugned constitutional rights.

According to the applicant, the main application enjoys prospects of success as she was discriminated against by the Supreme Court in Case No. SC443/21.

She also made the bald averment that the first respondent also wanted the matter to be determined to finality by this Court.

The applicant advanced the argument, that, it was important for this Court to make a ruling on whether the Supreme Court's decision to proceed with the matter under Case No. SC443/21 in her absence was fair and just.

It was the applicant's case, that, the Supreme Court furthered her injustice by dismissing her application for rescission in Case No. SC237/22, especially since the matter was determined by the same Bench which had presided over her appeal in Case No. SC443/21.

The grant of condonation was opposed by the first respondent.

It was submitted, that, the applicant's conduct was driven by a desire to remain on his property despite a valid ejectment order from the Magistrates Court under Case No. MC39520/16.

The first respondent alleged, that, the applicant was creating a trail of purportedly pending litigation to frustrate her eviction. He reasoned that the Supreme Court was well within its power to utilise Rule 53(3) of the Supreme Court Rules in the appeal proceedings under Case No. SC443/21. Thus, it was argued that the present proceedings were now a mere abuse of court process.

In response, the applicant submitted that the first respondent was intent on preventing the finalisation of the dispute. She proceeded to justify her interests in several matters pending before this Court and other judicial fora.

The rest of her answering affidavit was dedicated to objectionable material save for the insistence that her fundamental right to a fair trial had been violated by the conduct of the Supreme Court in the proceedings under Case No. SC443/21.

Submissions before this Court

At the hearing of the matter, it came to the Court's attention that the applicant had now been evicted by the first respondent in terms of the eviction order under Case No. MC39520/16.

The applicant confirmed that she was evicted on 23 May 2023.

She added that she had since filed a spoliation application in the High Court, which matter was still pending determination.

It became apparent that the instant application had since been overtaken by events and was now academic.

This point was appreciated by both parties, but, the applicant was resolute in proceeding with the matter despite its nominal bearing on her present predicament.

The applicant had no reasonable explanation for her failure to serve the first respondent as per Rule 9(7) of the Constitutional Court Rules 2016.

She persisted with the argument that she had effected service personally on the first respondent.

When directed to the content of Rule 9(7) of the Constitutional Court Rules, no credible or reasonable explanation was proffered as to why service had not been effected through the Sheriff as stipulated by the Rules.

She submitted, that, her intended application for direct access was in the interests of justice since the Supreme Court had violated her fundamental rights by proceeding with the appeal under Case No. SC443/21 in her absence.

The applicant suggested that there was evidence in her favour that she could have provided at the hearing before the Supreme Court.

In addition, she also impugned the conduct of the bench in Case No. SC237/22 for refusing to recuse themselves from determining her application for rescission.

Per contra, counsel, on behalf of the first respondent, submitted that the matter was now merely academic following the applicant's eviction from the property. As such, no consequential relief from this Court would restore her occupation since eviction was made in terms of a valid order under Case No. MC39520/16.

Counsel for the first respondent reiterated that the present proceedings were now an abuse of court process by the applicant. To that end, she sought costs on a higher scale as the first respondent was being constantly dragged to court without any just cause.

The applicant disputed the claim for costs as she insisted that she was merely vindicating her constitutional rights.

The Relief Sought

The relief sought before this Court was for an order framed as follows:

“1. Application for condonation of non-compliance with Rule 9(7) of the Constitutional Court Rules be and is hereby granted.

2. Application for extension of time within which to file and serve an application in terms of the rules be and is hereby granted.

3. There shall be no order as to costs if the matter is not opposed.”

The Governing Principles

The parties have helpfully referred the Court to some of the relevant principles in an application of this nature. Some of these principles will inform the Court's determination and are listed as follows:

(i) The degree of non-compliance;

(ii) The explanation for the non-compliance;

(iii) The importance of the case;

(iv) The prospects of success;

(v) The interests of justice;

(vi) The interests of finality in the case; and

(vii) The avoidance of unnecessary delay in the administration of justice.

See Mhora v Mhora CC05-22; K.M. Auctions (Pvt) Ltd v Samuel & Anor SC15-12…,.; Kodzwa v Secretary for Health & Anor 1999 (1) ZLR 313 (S)…,.; Terera v Lock & Others SC93-21; and Maheya v Independent African Church 2007 (2) ZLR 319 (S).

The Degree of and Explanation for the Non–Compliance

The warning has long often been sounded to litigants that petition the courts regarding non-compliance with the Rules. In the case of Museredza and Ors v Minister of Agriculture, Lands, Water and Rural Resettlement and Ors CC11-21, the following was reiterated by MAKARAU JCC:

“It is a rule of common law and an entrenched part of our practice and procedure that matters are to be brought before the court in accordance with the Rules of that court. The remarks of PATEL JCC in Marx Mupungu v The Minister of Agriculture, Lands, Water and Rural Resettlement and Others CC07-21 are apt. He wrote:

'One cannot institute an action or application in the High Court, or any other court, without due observance of and compliance with the Rules of that court. The Rules inform a litigant of what is required of him to access the court concerned. If he fails to observe or comply with those Rules, he will inevitably be non-suited.'”

Flowing from the above is the necessary implication, that, where litigants fall foul of the applicable Rules, a sufficient explanation must be tendered in order to be granted the Court's indulgence.

However, in the present case, the applicant's founding affidavit is bereft of any reasonable explanation.

Save for a heading titled “Extent of the delay and reasonableness of the explanation” the applicant made no attempt to bring the Court into her confidence regarding the circumstances that led to her non-compliance.

This deficit was further compounded during submissions before this Court where the applicant tendered no reasonable explanation for her non–compliance, except to insist that she had effected service personally upon the first respondent.

Generally, a measure of tolerance is afforded to self-actors. Reference is made to the case of Sibangani v Bindura University of Science and Education CC07-22…, wherein GOWORA JCC posited the following:

“There is an unwritten rule of practice, that, wherever possible and where justice demands, courts should ensure that unrepresented litigants be accorded a measure of tolerance where it concerns procedural issues.”

However, in this instance, where the applicant is seeking the indulgence of the Court, a failure to satisfy the foremost requirement for condonation cannot pass unheeded. The applicant does not accept any accountability for how and why her matter was struck off the roll.

She alternated between simply laying blame upon the first respondent and/or the Registrar.

As such, she has failed to provide an adequate explanation for her non-compliance in addition to completely disregarding the need to plead the degree of non-compliance adequately.

The Prospects of Success in the Main Matter

The applicant averred, that, she was treated in a discriminatory manner by the Supreme Court in Case No. SC443/21. She alleged that the presiding Bench in her matter subjected her to treatment distinct from that afforded to other litigants appearing before the Supreme Court. This violated her right to a fair trial in terms of section 69 in addition to the non–discriminatory provisions of section 56(1) of the Constitution.

However, the attached draft substantive application reveals the lack of any merit in the applicant's case.

There is no indication as to how the applicant was unfairly discriminated against by the Supreme Court through the utilisation of Rule 53(3) of the Supreme Court Rules 2018. The Rule grants the Supreme Court the authority to proceed as follows:

“53. Dismissal of appeal in the absence of heads of argument or appearance

(3) Where, at the time of the hearing of an appeal, there is no appearance for the appellant or no heads of argument have been filed by him, the court may, at its discretion, determine or dismiss the appeal and make such order as to costs as it may think fit.

(4) The registrar shall notify a registrar of the court whose judgment is appealed against of the dismissal of any appeal under this rule.”…,.

Patently, there was no infraction as suggested by the applicant. The Supreme Court was well within its purview to determine the merits of the appeal in her absence.

In her submissions, the applicant also failed to highlight how this authority was abused or utilized in a discriminatory manner.

SC12-18 : UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE vs KWANELE JIRIRA and LOUIS MASUKO
Ruled By: BHUNU JA

This is a chamber application for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Labour Court in terms of Rule 5(2) of the Supreme Court (Miscellaneous Appeals and References) Rules 1975.

The applicant is a tertiary educational institution incorporated as such under the University of Zimbabwe Act [Chapter 25:16].

Both respondents are its former workers who were employed as research fellows at its Institute of Development Studies. They were dismissed from employment by the Disciplinary Tribunal on allegations of misconduct. They are alleged to have wilfully refused to obey a lawful order to be re-deployed from the Institute of Development Studies offices to the University campus.

Aggrieved by their dismissal from employment, they approached the Labour Officer complaining of unfair dismissal. The Labour Officer, in turn, referred their grievance for arbitration. The arbitrator ruled in their favour and made an award of reinstatement, and, in the alternative, damages in lieu of reinstatement.

Dissatisfied with the arbitration award, the applicant appealed to the Labour Court without success. Unhappy with the decision of the Labour Court, the applicant sought leave to appeal to this court. On 5 April 2013, the Labour Court granted the applicant leave to appeal to this Court.

The applicant did not, however, reinstate the respondent as ordered by both the arbitrator and the Labour Court. As the result, the respondents approached the arbitrator for quantification of damages in lieu of reinstatement. The arbitrator assessed damages in the amounts of US$156,852=13 and US$134,362 respectively.

Aggrieved by the quantification award, the applicant, once again, appealed against that award to the Labour Court.

Despite the appeal, the respondents proceeded to register the award with the High Court for enforcement. A writ of execution and attachment of the applicant's property was subsequently issued.

The applicant made an urgent application for stay of execution without success. It then successfully appealed to this court for stay of execution pending appeal under judgment number SC06-13.

The applicant's appeal against the quantification award was subsequently dismissed by the Labour Court.

Its complaint is that CHIVIZHE J granted the application for dismissal of the appeal without a formal hearing of the appeal.

They allege, that, despite numerous requests, the honourable judge failed to provide the applicant with reasons for judgment, resulting in the lapse of time stipulated of the intended appeal.

It therefore became necessary to apply for condonation and extension of time to file an application for leave to apply to this Court.

Both parties filed heads of argument.

The applicant now alleges, that, while they were waiting for the set down date of hearing they were surprised to receive a written judgment by HOVE J dismissing the application for leave to appeal to this Court.

It is not clear to me, but, it appears that the matter was subsequently placed before the same judge who then properly heard the application and dismissed the applicant's claim under judgment LCH/H/472/2011 at page 56 of the record of proceedings.

It is this judgment which prompted this application.

In terms section 92F(3) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01], where a judge of the Labour Court refuses to grant leave to appeal, the applicant may seek leave from a judge of this Court.

When a judge of the Supreme Court sits in chambers to decide the application for leave to appeal, he does not treat the application as an appeal against the refusal to grant leave by the court a quo. He simply decides the matter on the merits as if it was a fresh application before him/her.

For that reason, while he may consider the criticisms levelled against the judge in the court a quo, these are not overriding considerations, because, he makes his own independent, fresh determination on the basis of the papers and arguments placed before him/her.

I now turn to consider the application for leave to appeal to this Court on the merits.

An application for leave to appeal to this Court is firmly grounded on the applicant's prospects of success on appeal.

In terms of section 92F of the Labour Act, appeals from the Labour Court only lie to this Court on a point of law.

In that regard, the first question for consideration is whether the applicant's grounds of appeal raise a point of law.

The grounds of appeal essentially raises the question whether the applicant was subjected to a fair trial when CHIVIZHE J issued an order, under case number LC/H/145/11, without giving reasons for the order which it has branded a judgment.

The order is dated 31 October 2012 and it reads:

“IN THE LABOUR COURT OF ZIMBABWE

LC/H/145/11

In the matter between:

KWANELE JIRIRA & ANOTHER: Applicants

UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE: Respondents

Before the Honourable B T Chivizhe, President

(IN CHAMBERS)

Whereupon, after reading documents filed of record:

IT IS ORDERED THAT -

The application for dismissal of appeal in terms of Rule 19(3)(a) of the Labour Court Rules be and is hereby granted.”

The above order is clearly not a judgment but an order given by the learned judge a quo sitting in chambers.

This is so because it does not bear a judgment number or reasons for judgment. It cites no legal representatives, signifying that none were heard - although both parties had legal representation.

This is clearly a default judgment.

It is not correct for the applicant to say, in its founding affidavit, that, the learned judge did not give reasons for its judgment. This is because, in the same breath, it confesses that the judgment was given pursuant to an application for dismissal of its appeal because of its failure to file heads of argument timeously.

It is therefore plain, that, the applicant's appeal was dismissed for want of compliance with the Rules.

Nowhere in its grounds of appeal does the applicant allege that it filed its heads of argument timeously....,.

The so called judgment it seeks to impugn is dated 31 October 2012. It only approached this court for relief about two and a half years later on 15 March 2015.

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Appeal, Leave to Appeal re: Approach, Notice of Appeal and the Right of Appeal iro Default Judgment

SC02-17 : GUOXING GONG vs MAYOR LOGISTICS (PRIVATE) LIMITED and THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS
Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, BHUNU JA and UCHENA JA

SC67-19 : DANIEL CHINTENGO vs TREDCOR ZIMBABWE (PRIVATE) LIMITED t/a TRENTYRE ZIMBABWE
Ruled By: MALABA CJ, GUVAVA JA and BERE JA

SC54-06 : VIGOUR FUYANA vs NTOMBAZA MOYO
Ruled By: CHIDYAUSIKU CJ

SC11-21 : TENDAI BONDE vs NATIONAL FOODS LTD and LOVEJOY NYANDORO [as Chairman of Appeals Committee] and CHIPO NHETA [as Chairman of Works Council]
Ruled By: GUVAVA JA

SC100-21 : PARKHAM ENTERPRISES (PVT) LTD and NYASHA MOTSI vs ADHESIVE PRODUCTS MANUFACTURES (PVT) LTD and THE MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT N.O.
Ruled By: CHITAKUNYE JA

SC134-21 : OK ZIMBABWE LIMITED vs BENJAMIN TAZVIVINGA
Ruled By: GWAUNZA DCJ, HLATSHWAYO JA and BERE JA

CC07-23 : RITA MBATHA vs VINCENT NCUBE and MESSENGER OF COURT
Ruled By: PATEL JCC

SC12-18 : UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE vs KWANELE JIRIRA and LOUIS MASUKO
Ruled By: BHUNU JA

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Law Portal Zimbabwe

Appeal, Leave to Appeal re: Approach, Notice of Appeal and the Right of Appeal iro Default Judgment

SC02-17 : GUOXING GONG vs MAYOR LOGISTICS (PRIVATE) LIMITED and THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, BHUNU JA and UCHENA JA

SC67-19 : DANIEL CHINTENGO vs TREDCOR ZIMBABWE (PRIVATE) LIMITED t/a TRENTYRE ZIMBABWE Ruled By: MALABA CJ, GUVAVA JA and BERE JA

SC54-06 : VIGOUR FUYANA vs NTOMBAZA MOYO Ruled By: CHIDYAUSIKU CJ

SC11-21 : TENDAI BONDE vs NATIONAL FOODS LTD and LOVEJOY NYANDORO [as Chairman of Appeals Committee] and CHIPO NHETA [as Chairman of Works Council] Ruled By: GUVAVA JA

SC100-21 : PARKHAM ENTERPRISES (PVT) LTD and NYASHA MOTSI vs ADHESIVE PRODUCTS MANUFACTURES (PVT) LTD and THE MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT N.O. Ruled By: CHITAKUNYE JA

SC134-21 : OK ZIMBABWE LIMITED vs BENJAMIN TAZVIVINGA Ruled By: GWAUNZA DCJ, HLATSHWAYO JA and BERE JA

CC07-23 : RITA MBATHA vs VINCENT NCUBE and MESSENGER OF COURT Ruled By: PATEL JCC

SC12-18 : UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE vs KWANELE JIRIRA and LOUIS MASUKO Ruled By: BHUNU JA

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Law Portal
Zimbabwe

SC02-17 : GUOXING GONG vs MAYOR LOGISTICS (PRIVATE) LIMITED and THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS
Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, BHUNU JA and UCHENA JA

SC67-19 : DANIEL CHINTENGO vs TREDCOR ZIMBABWE (PRIVATE) LIMITED t/a TRENTYRE ZIMBABWE
Ruled By: MALABA CJ, GUVAVA JA and BERE JA

SC54-06 : VIGOUR FUYANA vs NTOMBAZA MOYO
Ruled By: CHIDYAUSIKU CJ

SC11-21 : TENDAI BONDE vs NATIONAL FOODS LTD and LOVEJOY NYANDORO [as Chairman of Appeals Committee] and CHIPO NHETA [as Chairman of Works Council]
Ruled By: GUVAVA JA

SC100-21 : PARKHAM ENTERPRISES (PVT) LTD and NYASHA MOTSI vs ADHESIVE PRODUCTS MANUFACTURES (PVT) LTD and THE MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT N.O.
Ruled By: CHITAKUNYE JA

SC134-21 : OK ZIMBABWE LIMITED vs BENJAMIN TAZVIVINGA
Ruled By: GWAUNZA DCJ, HLATSHWAYO JA and BERE JA

CC07-23 : RITA MBATHA vs VINCENT NCUBE and MESSENGER OF COURT
Ruled By: PATEL JCC

SC12-18 : UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE vs KWANELE JIRIRA and LOUIS MASUKO
Ruled By: BHUNU JA