Law Portal
Zimbabwe

Welcome To Law Portal

Welcome, Guest!
[Help?]

HB95-09 - GODWELL ZINYAWO vs THE STATE

  • View Judgment By Categories
  • View Full Judgment

Procedural Law-viz criminal appeal.

Procedural Law-viz criminal appeal re rape.
Rape-viz fifty-six year old man.
Rape-viz twelve year old juvenile victim.
Charge-viz rape re section 65(1)(a) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23].
Sentencing-viz rape.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re involuntary reporting of the case to the police iro involuntary complainant.
Rape-viz involuntary reporting of the rape.
Procedural Law-viz inadmissible evidence re involuntary police report made by a complainant iro a police report induced by a third party.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re  the rule against narrative or self-corroboration.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re expert evidence iro medical evidence.
Procedural Law-viz expert opinion re medical affidavit iro rape.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re evidence of identification iro mistaken identity.
Rape-viz false implication.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re findings of fact iro witness credibility.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re findings of fact iro assessment of evidence and the facts.
Rape-viz in loco parentis re fifty-six year old accused iro aggravating factor.
Rape-viz unprotected sexual act re aggravating factor.
Sentencing-viz prevalent offence.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re independent evidence iro the rule against narrative or self-corroboration.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re previous consistent statement iro the rule against narrative or self-corroboration.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re undisputed facts.

Rape and Approach to Sexual Assault Cases

We dismissed the appeal against conviction and sentence. These are our reasons for doing so.

The appellant, a fifty-six year old man, was convicted by a Bulawayo Regional Magistrate of raping a twelve year old girl, i.e. rape, as defined in section 65(1)(a) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23].  

From the record of proceedings, he was not convicted for want of protestation.

He has appealed against both conviction and sentence.

Most facts are common cause, or at least beyond dispute. The salient facts are the following.

The complainant knew the appellant very well before the date of the crime. The appellant was employed as a security guard at Techno Exports at Northend Shopping Centre. On the 5th of October 2008, the complainant, and her juvenile (female) friend went to the appellant's place of employment. The appellant was carrying out guard duties at a construction site. At the site, there was a stationary T35 truck. The complainant, and her friend, got into this truck and started playing. It is common cause that the appellant approached these girls.

What transpired when he got there is hotly disputed.

It is the appellant's case, on the one hand, that he chased these children away. The children later returned to play in the truck but he did not chase them, but, instead, let them play until they got tired and left.

On the other hand, the respondent's case is that upon his arrival, the complainant's friend jumped off the truck. The appellant remained in the truck with the complainant. He removed the complainant's underpants, made her to lie on the seat facing upwards, and proceeded to rape her. After the rape, the appellant threatened to kill the complainant if she reported the matter.

Sentencing re: Sexual Offences iro Rape

He was sentenced to undergo fifteen years imprisonment, of which three years imprisonment was suspended for five years on the usual conditions of good future behaviour.

As far as sentence is concerned, counsel for the appellant did concede before us that the sentence was within the sentencing discretion of the learned Regional Magistrate in the court a quo.

This concession was properly made.

The sentence imposed is appropriate for the offence. In fact, if the sentence is to be criticized, it is because it is on the lenient side. The appellant, at the age of fifty-six, was old enough to be the twelve year old complainant's grandfather. He injured the complainant in her genitals..., in the cause of the rape. He was known to the complainant as a local elder, i.e. he was in loco parentis. From the facts, it does not seem that the sexual act was protected.

Offences involving the rape of juveniles are disturbingly prevalent.

Accordingly, we dismissed the appeal against both conviction and sentence.

Corroborative Evidence re: Approach iro The Rule Against Narratives or Self-Corroboration

Indeed, it is common cause that the complainant did not voluntarily report the rape.

It was her aunt, Nombeko Nyoni, who noticed that her pair of trousers was bloodstained, and asked her. The complainant attributed the blood stains to her menstruation. It was only after the aunt threatened her that she made a report about the rape.

Counsel for the applicant argued, in his heads, and before us, that such evidence of the report by the complainant is inadmissible.

He has a point, as the report to the aunt was induced by threats from her aunt.

Generally, previous consistent statements are excluded because they are insufficiently relevant. This is called the rule against narrative or self-corroboration – The South African Law of Evidence (4th Edition) by LTT HOFFMAN and DT ZEFFERT..., and S v Garande 2002 (1) ZLR 297 (H)...,. At..., I observed -

 “A complainant in a sexual case is admitted as an exception to this general rule. Author John Reid-Rowland in Criminal Procedure in Zimbabwe, stated the rule in the following terms (p21-8):

'To be admissible, the complaint must have been made at the first opportunity after the offence which reasonably offers itself. What is reasonable will depend on the circumstances. A great deal will depend on such factors as the complainant's age, and the opportunity hear she had to complain to a person to whom he or she could reasonably be expected to complain.

The complaint must not have been induced by threats, or by leading questions, though it need not necessarily have been spontaneous. The terms of the complaint have to be proved, as well as the fact that a complaint was made, but the contents of complaint may not be used as independent evidence of the facts alleged. The complaint must give evidence of those.'

Before previous consistent statement is admitted in a sexual case, the court has to be satisfied that it meets these requirements.”

In casu, the court a quo was alive to the fact that the complaint was adduced by persistent question and threats by the aunt.

She said so in her judgment.

She appreciated that the reluctance to disclose the alleged rapist is attributed to a combination of two factors, namely, her tender age, and threats by the appellant to kill her if she disclosed the rape. In any event, the aunt's threat could not be said to have had the effect of inducing the complainant to fabricate such an intricate story to the police, and repeat it in her testimony in the court a quo.

Evidence of Identification, Identification Parade, Tool Mark Evidence, Alias, Evidence Aliunde & the Defence of Alibi

The appellant has subjected the testimony adduced by the State witnesses to a microscopic analysis. In the process, he managed to pick up a few discrepancies.

The inconsistencies raised by the appellant are not of a material nature. This is a mere hocus-pocus to draw our attention away from the material evidence adduced during the trial. Looking at the evidence, the issues are narrow. This is so because, in addition to the undisputed facts alluded to above, there is clear evidence that the complainant was sexually molested.

With such clear evidence of the sexual abuse of the complainant, the only way for determination was the identity of the person who raped her.

She said it is the appellant.

There is no question of mistaken identity in this case as she knew the appellant very well prior to the offence.

Expert Evidence, Opinion Evidence and Toolmark Evidence re: Approach and the Limited Expert Knowledge of the Court

There is evidence of her bloodstained garment, and medical evidence by Dr. S. Bachs and Dr. T. Gunguwo.

Both doctors observed that the complainant's hymen was torn, there was laceration in her fourchette, and also some haemorrhage (i.e. bleeding heavily).

Appeal re: Findings of Fact or Exercise of Discretion Made by Trial Court iro Terminated or Complete Proceedings

The only issue is whether she was falsely implicating the appellant.

The court a quo believed the complainant's testimony. The learned Regional Magistrate made a finding of fact. The credibility was based on the demeanour of the complainant, and the facts.

It is trite law that the assessment of the credibility of a witness is the province of the trial court.

Appeal re: Findings of Fact or Exercise of Discretion Made by Trial Court iro Terminated or Complete Proceedings

An appellate court will not interfere unless there is something grossly irregular in the proceedings to warrant such interference.

There is no such gross irregularity in casu – S v Isolano 1985 (2) ZLR 62 (S); S v Zulu HB52-03; and Marx v S (2005) 4 ALL SA 267 (SCA).

In light of the above, there is no merit in the appeal against conviction.

NDOU J:        We dismissed the appeal against conviction and sentence.  These are our reasons for doing so.  The appellant, a 56 year old man, was convicted by a Bulawayo Regional Magistrate of raping a 12 year old girl i.e. rape as defined in section 65(1)(a) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23].  From the record of proceedings, he was not convicted for want of protestation.  He was sentenced to undergo 15 years imprisonment of which 3 years imprisonment was suspended for 5 years on the usual conditions of good future behavior.  He has appealed against both conviction and sentence.  Most facts are common cause or at least beyond dispute.  The salient facts are the following.  The complainant knew the appellant very well before the date of crime.  The appellant was employed as a security guard at Techno Exports at Northend Shopping Centre.  On the 5th October 2008 the complainant and her juvenile (female) friend went to the appellant's place of employment.  The appellant was carrying out guard duties at a construction site.  At the site there was a stationary T 35 truck.  The complainant and her friend got into this truck and started playing.  It is common cause that the appellant approached these girls.  What transpired when he got there is hotly disputed.  It is the appellant's case on the one hand that he chased these children away.  The children later returned to play in the truck but he did not chase them but instead let them play until they got tired and left.  On the other hand, the respondent's is that upon his arrival, the complainant's friend jumped off the truck.  The appellant remained in the truck with the complainant.  He removed the complaint's underpants, made her to lie on the seat facing upwards and proceeded to rape her.  After the rape, the appellant threatened to kill the complainant if she reported the matter.  Indeed it is common cause that the complainant did not voluntarily report the rape.  It was her aunt, Nombeko Nyoni who noticed that her pair of trousers was bloodstained and asked her.  The complainant attributed the blood stains to her menstruation.  It was only after the aunt threatened her that she made a report about the rape.  Mr Moyo, for the appellant argued in his heads and before us that such evidence of the report by complainant is inadmissible.  He has a point as the report to the aunt was induced by threats from her aunt.  Generally, previous consistent statements are excluded because they are insufficiently relevant.  This is called rule against narrative or self-corroboration – The South African Law of Evidence (4th Edition) by Ltt Hoffman and D T Zeffertt pp 119-121 and S v Garande 2002(1) ZLR 297 (H) at 300E-301B.  At 300F to 301B I observed “A complaint in a sexual case is admitted as an exception to this general rule.  Author John Reid-Rowland in Criminal Procedure in Zimbabwe, stated the rule in the following terms (p21-8):

“To be admissible, the complaint must have been made at the first opportunity after the offence which reasonably offers itself.  What is reasonable will depend on the circumstances.  A great deal will depend on such factors as the complainant's age and the opportunity hear she had to complain to a person to whom he or she could reasonably be expected to complain.

 

The complaint must not have been induced by threats or by leading questions, though it need not necessarily have been spontaneous.  The terms of the complaint have to be proved as well as the fact that a complaint was made, but the contents of complaint may not be used as independent evidence of the facts alleged.  The complaint must give evidence of those.”

Before previous consistent statement is admitted in a sexual case the court has to be satisfied that is meets these requirements.”

           

In casu, the court a quo was alive to the fact that the complaint was adduced by persistent question and threats by the aunt.  She said so in her judgment.  She appreciated that the reluctance to disclose the alleged rapist is attributed to a combination of two factors, namely her tender age and threats by the appellant to kill her if she disclosed the rape.  In any event, the aunt's threat could not be said to have had the effect of inducing the complainant to fabricate such an intricate story to the police and repeat it in her testimony in the court a quo.  The appellant has subjected the testimony adduced by the state witnesses to a microscopic analysis.  In the process he managed to pick up a few discrepancies.  The inconsistencies raised by the appellant are not of a material nature.  This is a mere hocus-pocus to draw our attention away from the material evidence adduced during the trial.  Looking at the evidence, the issues are narrow.  This is so because in addition to the undisputed facts alluded to above, there is clear evidence that the complaint was sexually molested.  There is evidence of her bloodstained garment and medical evidence by Dr S Bachs and Dr T Gunguwo.  Both doctors observed that the complainant's hymen was torn, there was laceration in her fourchette and also some haemorrage (i.e bleeding heavily).  With such clear evidence of the sexual abuse of the complainant, the only way for determination was the identity of the person who raped her.  She said it is the appellant.  There is no question of mistaken identity in this case as she knew the appellant very well prior the offence.  The only issue is whether she was falsely implicating the appellant.  The court a quo believed the complainant's testimony.  The learned regional magistrate made a finding of fact.  The credibility was based on the demeanor of the complainant and the facts.  It is trite law that the assessment of the credibility of a witness is the province of the trial court.  An appellate court will not interfere unless there is something grossly irregular in the proceedings to warrant such interference.  There is no such gross irregularity in casu. S v Isolano 1985(2) ZLR 62 (S); S v Zulu HB-52-03 and Marx v S [2005] 4 ALL SA 267 (SCA).  In light of the above, there is no merit in the appeal against the conviction.

            As far as sentence is concerned Mr Moyo did conceded before us that the sentence was within the sentencing discretion of the learned regional magistrate in the court a quo.  This concession was properly made.  The sentence imposed is appropriate for the offence.  In fact, if the sentence is to be criticized, it is because it is on the lenient side.  The appellant, at the age of 56 was old enough to be the 12 year old complainant's grandfather.  He was 44 years older than the complainant at the rape.  He injured the complainant in her genitals as alluded to above in the cause of the rape.  He was known to the complainant as a local elder, i.e. he was in loco parentis.  From the facts it does not seem that the sexual act was protected.  Offences involving rape of juveniles are disturbingly prevalent.

            Accordingly, we dismissed the appeal against both conviction and sentence.

 

 

 

 

                                    Kamocha J ………………………………….. I agree

 

Moyo & Nyoni, appellant's legal practitioners

Criminal Division, Attorney General's Office, respondent's legal practitioners
Back Main menu

Categories

Back to top