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HH89-12 - THE STATE vs PIKIRAI MAMBODO

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Murder-viz mob assault re the doctrine of common purpose.
Murder-viz multiple assailants re the doctrine of common purpose.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re expert evidence iro postmortem report.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re defences iro the defence of compulsion.
Defences-viz the defence of compulsion.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re findings of fact iro concessions between counsel.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re findings of fact iro agreements between counsel.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re findings of fact iro witness testimony.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re warned and cautioned statement iro the presumption of clarity of events nearer the date of the event.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re Defence Outline iro disparities between the warned and cautioned statement and oral evidence.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re Defence Outline iro inconsistencies between the warned and cautioned statement and viva voce evidence.
Murder-viz intention.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re physical evidence iro murder weapon.
Murder-viz culpable homicide re violent conduct.
Sentencing-viz culpable homicide.
Sentencing-viz sentencing approach re the pre-sentence enquiry iro assessment of mitigating and aggravating factors.
Sentencing-viz sentencing approach re youthful offenders.
Sentencing-viz sentencing approach re first offenders.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re defences iro belief in witchcraft.
Defences-viz diminished mental responsibility re provocation iro witchcraft-provocation.

Defence of Compulsion


On 6 April 2008, the accused, who was 17 years old and in the company of his cousin, the late Trust Macharangwanda, approached the deceased and accused her of practicing witchcraft and being responsible for death and illnesses in the family.

The deceased, who was 69 years old, protested her innocence and suggested that the accusations required the presence of family elders. The result was a combined assault initiated by Trust Macharangwanda and joined in by the accused. The two randomly assaulted the deceased using two sticks leading to the subsequent death of the deceased.

The post mortem report compiled by Dr David Tarumbwa recorded that there were multiple bruises and abrasions on the deceased's body. The doctor also observed and recorded the deceased had sustained a fractured occipital skull which was depressed with massive haemorrhage. The doctor concluded that the cause of the deceased's death was the head injury caused by the assault perpetrated on her.

The State alleged the accused was partly to blame because of his involvement in the tragic assault and in doing so they relied on the doctrine of common purpose.

Whilst agreeing to having taken part in assaulting the deceased the accused raised the defence of compulsion which was basically an averment by the accused that he had been compelled or forced to commit the assault by the late Trust Macharangwanda who was older than him and assumed control of the proceedings leading to the assault and subsequent death of the deceased.

The basic requirements of the defence of compulsion has been eloquently stated and unanimously agreed by both counsel and it is not my intention to re-state it. Suffice it to say that it basically requires that for it to succeed evidence must abound to demonstrate, in very clear terms, that the crime in issue was induced by real and substantial threat and not cosmetic threats. Committing the crime in issue must have been the only avenue open to the accused in the given circumstances. The evidence must also show, very clearly, that the accused could not reasonably have been expected to have avoided the crime.

Authorities are in agreement that this defence will not avail itself to someone who voluntarily joins in advancing a criminal objective.

Having carefully weighed the requirements of the defence of compulsion both the State and the defence concluded the defence of compulsion was not sustainable in this case.

We entirely agree with counsels' reading of the evidence presented and the conclusion arrived at. The issue of compulsion is accordingly put to rest.

Murder re: Mob Assault, Multiple Assailants or Murder By a Group

On 6 April 2008, the accused, who was 17 years old and in the company of his cousin, the late Trust Macharangwanda, approached the deceased and accused her of practicing witchcraft and being responsible for death and illnesses in the family.

The deceased, who was 69 years old, protested her innocence and suggested that the accusations required the presence of family elders. The result was a combined assault initiated by Trust Macharangwanda and joined in by the accused. The two randomly assaulted the deceased using two sticks leading to the subsequent death of the deceased.

The post mortem report compiled by Dr David Tarumbwa recorded that there were multiple bruises and abrasions on the deceased's body. The doctor also observed and recorded the deceased had sustained a fractured occipital skull which was depressed with massive haemorrhage. The doctor concluded that the cause of the deceased's death was the head injury caused by the assault perpetrated on her.

The State alleged the accused was partly to blame because of his involvement in the tragic assault and in doing so they relied on the doctrine of common purpose.

Whilst agreeing to having taken part in assaulting the deceased the accused raised the defence of compulsion which was basically an averment by the accused that he had been compelled or forced to commit the assault by the late Trust Macharangwanda who was older than him and assumed control of the proceedings leading to the assault and subsequent death of the deceased.

The basic requirements of the defence of compulsion has been eloquently stated and unanimously agreed by both counsel and it is not my intention to re-state it. Suffice it to say that it basically requires that for it to succeed evidence must abound to demonstrate, in very clear terms, that the crime in issue was induced by real and substantial threat and not cosmetic threats. Committing the crime in issue must have been the only avenue open to the accused in the given circumstances. The evidence must also show, very clearly, that the accused could not reasonably have been expected to have avoided the crime.

Authorities are in agreement that this defence will not avail itself to someone who voluntarily joins in advancing a criminal objective.

Having carefully weighed the requirements of the defence of compulsion both the State and the defence concluded the defence of compulsion was not sustainable in this case.

We entirely agree with counsels' reading of the evidence presented and the conclusion arrived at. The issue of compulsion is accordingly put to rest.

The viva voce evidence of Esinath Mwareka took us through how the assault itself was carried out. The accused also testified on the assault itself.

We are satisfied that despite some unconvincing aspects of her testimony, like her indifference in describing to the court's satisfaction the type of switch used by the accused, Esinath's version of events leading to the death of the deceased was quite credible. Her version was more revealing as opposed to the version given by the accused person which was characterised by rough edges.

We found it to have been quite revealing and significant that the accused's version of what transpired, as explained by him in court, almost three (3) years after the event, was at variance with his summary of events given on 26 April 2008 at Mukurasine Police Station and subsequently confirmed at Chiredzi Court on 26 June 2008. We are satisfied his explanation in Court was calculated to mislead the Court and therefore we had no hesitation in rejecting it.

From the agreed evidence, the prosecution advocated for the accused to be found guilty of the crime of murder with constructive intent whilst the defence passionately argued that the evidence suggested no more than the commission of the crime of culpable homicide.

From a practical point there is a very thin line between murder with constructive intent and the offence of culpable homicide but the distinction must and has always been maintained.

For murder with constructive intent to be returned as a verdict the issue which must occupy the mind of the Court is whether, as a matter of inference deriving from the set of facts accepted by the Court, it can be said the accused foresaw that his conduct would result in the death of the deceased. An accused can only be convicted of murder if the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the facts proved is that the accused had legal intention to do so. The test becomes a subjective one. The Court is enjoined to take into account factual evidence which bears upon and could have affected the accused's perception, powers of judgment, and state of mind, deriving from such factors like the level of the accused's intelligence, age of the accused person, personality etc - the list is endless.

If the Court concludes that the accused could not have foreseen the possibility of death but that he should have foreseen it (relying on the reasonable man's test) and that a reasonable man would have guarded against it, the correct verdict must be culpable homicide.

It must be emphasised that in borderline cases, the Court must lean in favour of the verdict of culpable homicide and this approach appears to be influenced by the time-honoured and well cherished principle of our approach that the accused, as opposed to the State, must generally be granted the benefit of doubt.

It is never an easy walk.

In the instant case, the Court has had the benefit of seeing one of the sticks used. We have assessed the accused's level of intelligence, age at the time of the committing of the offence, and the fact that there is overwhelming evidence that the accused was not himself in control of the situation that led to the accused's tragic assault.

We are in agreement that it cannot be concluded, with a degree of certainty, that the accused could have foreseen that his involvement in the assault of the deceased would ultimately lead to the deceased's death.

However, it is our firm view that although the accused did not foresee death as a result of his conduct, a reasonable man placed in the shoes of the accused person would have foreseen that subjecting a sixty nine year old woman to the assault with the sticks or switches described to the Court would have resulted in her death and that the accused should have guarded against it.

He did not do so and we are enjoined to return a verdict of guilty of culpable homicide.

Verdict – Not guilty of murder but guilty of Culpable Homicide….,.

The conduct of some of our traditional healers and self proclaimed profits has not escaped our attention. So much confusion and hatred are sometimes as a result of the conduct of such traditional healers.

Accessory, Accomplice, Common Purpose, Conspiracy to Commit, Co-perpetrators and Complicity re: Approach


On 6 April 2008, the accused, who was 17 years old and in the company of his cousin, the late Trust Macharangwanda, approached the deceased and accused her of practicing witchcraft and being responsible for death and illnesses in the family.

The deceased, who was 69 years old, protested her innocence and suggested that the accusations required the presence of family elders. The result was a combined assault initiated by Trust Macharangwanda and joined in by the accused. The two randomly assaulted the deceased using two sticks leading to the subsequent death of the deceased.

The post mortem report compiled by Dr David Tarumbwa recorded that there were multiple bruises and abrasions on the deceased's body. The doctor also observed and recorded the deceased had sustained a fractured occipital skull which was depressed with massive haemorrhage. The doctor concluded that the cause of the deceased's death was the head injury caused by the assault perpetrated on her.

The State alleged the accused was partly to blame because of his involvement in the tragic assault and in doing so they relied on the doctrine of common purpose.

Whilst agreeing to having taken part in assaulting the deceased the accused raised the defence of compulsion which was basically an averment by the accused that he had been compelled or forced to commit the assault by the late Trust Macharangwanda who was older than him and assumed control of the proceedings leading to the assault and subsequent death of the deceased.

The basic requirements of the defence of compulsion has been eloquently stated and unanimously agreed by both counsel and it is not my intention to re-state it. Suffice it to say that it basically requires that for it to succeed evidence must abound to demonstrate, in very clear terms, that the crime in issue was induced by real and substantial threat and not cosmetic threats. Committing the crime in issue must have been the only avenue open to the accused in the given circumstances. The evidence must also show, very clearly, that the accused could not reasonably have been expected to have avoided the crime.

Authorities are in agreement that this defence will not avail itself to someone who voluntarily joins in advancing a criminal objective.

Having carefully weighed the requirements of the defence of compulsion both the State and the defence concluded the defence of compulsion was not sustainable in this case.

We entirely agree with counsels' reading of the evidence presented and the conclusion arrived at. The issue of compulsion is accordingly put to rest.

The viva voce evidence of Esinath Mwareka took us through how the assault itself was carried out. The accused also testified on the assault itself.

We are satisfied that despite some unconvincing aspects of her testimony, like her indifference in describing to the court's satisfaction the type of switch used by the accused, Esinath's version of events leading to the death of the deceased was quite credible. Her version was more revealing as opposed to the version given by the accused person which was characterised by rough edges.

We found it to have been quite revealing and significant that the accused's version of what transpired, as explained by him in court, almost three (3) years after the event, was at variance with his summary of events given on 26 April 2008 at Mukurasine Police Station and subsequently confirmed at Chiredzi Court on 26 June 2008. We are satisfied his explanation in Court was calculated to mislead the Court and therefore we had no hesitation in rejecting it.

From the agreed evidence, the prosecution advocated for the accused to be found guilty of the crime of murder with constructive intent whilst the defence passionately argued that the evidence suggested no more than the commission of the crime of culpable homicide.

From a practical point there is a very thin line between murder with constructive intent and the offence of culpable homicide but the distinction must and has always been maintained.

For murder with constructive intent to be returned as a verdict the issue which must occupy the mind of the Court is whether, as a matter of inference deriving from the set of facts accepted by the Court, it can be said the accused foresaw that his conduct would result in the death of the deceased. An accused can only be convicted of murder if the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the facts proved is that the accused had legal intention to do so. The test becomes a subjective one. The Court is enjoined to take into account factual evidence which bears upon and could have affected the accused's perception, powers of judgment, and state of mind, deriving from such factors like the level of the accused's intelligence, age of the accused person, personality etc - the list is endless.

If the Court concludes that the accused could not have foreseen the possibility of death but that he should have foreseen it (relying on the reasonable man's test) and that a reasonable man would have guarded against it, the correct verdict must be culpable homicide.

It must be emphasised that in borderline cases, the Court must lean in favour of the verdict of culpable homicide and this approach appears to be influenced by the time-honoured and well cherished principle of our approach that the accused, as opposed to the State, must generally be granted the benefit of doubt.

It is never an easy walk.

In the instant case, the Court has had the benefit of seeing one of the sticks used. We have assessed the accused's level of intelligence, age at the time of the committing of the offence, and the fact that there is overwhelming evidence that the accused was not himself in control of the situation that led to the accused's tragic assault.

We are in agreement that it cannot be concluded, with a degree of certainty, that the accused could have foreseen that his involvement in the assault of the deceased would ultimately lead to the deceased's death.

However, it is our firm view that although the accused did not foresee death as a result of his conduct, a reasonable man placed in the shoes of the accused person would have foreseen that subjecting a sixty nine year old woman to the assault with the sticks or switches described to the Court would have resulted in her death and that the accused should have guarded against it.

He did not do so and we are enjoined to return a verdict of guilty of culpable homicide.

Verdict – Not guilty of murder but guilty of Culpable Homicide….,.

The conduct of some of our traditional healers and self proclaimed profits has not escaped our attention. So much confusion and hatred are sometimes as a result of the conduct of such traditional healers.

Defence of Diminished Mental Responsibility or Diminished Capacity re: Provocation iro Witchcraft & Cultural Beliefs


On 6 April 2008, the accused, who was 17 years old and in the company of his cousin, the late Trust Macharangwanda, approached the deceased and accused her of practicing witchcraft and being responsible for death and illnesses in the family.

The deceased, who was 69 years old, protested her innocence and suggested that the accusations required the presence of family elders. The result was a combined assault initiated by Trust Macharangwanda and joined in by the accused. The two randomly assaulted the deceased using two sticks leading to the subsequent death of the deceased.

The post mortem report compiled by Dr David Tarumbwa recorded that there were multiple bruises and abrasions on the deceased's body. The doctor also observed and recorded the deceased had sustained a fractured occipital skull which was depressed with massive haemorrhage. The doctor concluded that the cause of the deceased's death was the head injury caused by the assault perpetrated on her....,.

The viva voce evidence of Esinath Mwareka took us through how the assault itself was carried out. The accused also testified on the assault itself.

We are satisfied that despite some unconvincing aspects of her testimony, like her indifference in describing to the court's satisfaction the type of switch used by the accused, Esinath's version of events leading to the death of the deceased was quite credible. Her version was more revealing as opposed to the version given by the accused person which was characterised by rough edges.

We found it to have been quite revealing and significant that the accused's version of what transpired, as explained by him in court, almost three (3) years after the event, was at variance with his summary of events given on 26 April 2008 at Mukurasine Police Station and subsequently confirmed at Chiredzi Court on 26 June 2008. We are satisfied his explanation in Court was calculated to mislead the Court and therefore we had no hesitation in rejecting it.

From the agreed evidence, the prosecution advocated for the accused to be found guilty of the crime of murder with constructive intent whilst the defence passionately argued that the evidence suggested no more than the commission of the crime of culpable homicide.

From a practical point there is a very thin line between murder with constructive intent and the offence of culpable homicide but the distinction must and has always been maintained.

For murder with constructive intent to be returned as a verdict the issue which must occupy the mind of the Court is whether, as a matter of inference deriving from the set of facts accepted by the Court, it can be said the accused foresaw that his conduct would result in the death of the deceased. An accused can only be convicted of murder if the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the facts proved is that the accused had legal intention to do so. The test becomes a subjective one. The Court is enjoined to take into account factual evidence which bears upon and could have affected the accused's perception, powers of judgment, and state of mind, deriving from such factors like the level of the accused's intelligence, age of the accused person, personality etc - the list is endless.

If the Court concludes that the accused could not have foreseen the possibility of death but that he should have foreseen it (relying on the reasonable man's test) and that a reasonable man would have guarded against it, the correct verdict must be culpable homicide.

It must be emphasised that in borderline cases, the Court must lean in favour of the verdict of culpable homicide and this approach appears to be influenced by the time-honoured and well cherished principle of our approach that the accused, as opposed to the State, must generally be granted the benefit of doubt.

It is never an easy walk.

In the instant case, the Court has had the benefit of seeing one of the sticks used. We have assessed the accused's level of intelligence, age at the time of the committing of the offence, and the fact that there is overwhelming evidence that the accused was not himself in control of the situation that led to the accused's tragic assault.

We are in agreement that it cannot be concluded, with a degree of certainty, that the accused could have foreseen that his involvement in the assault of the deceased would ultimately lead to the deceased's death.

However, it is our firm view that although the accused did not foresee death as a result of his conduct, a reasonable man placed in the shoes of the accused person would have foreseen that subjecting a sixty nine year old woman to the assault with the sticks or switches described to the Court would have resulted in her death and that the accused should have guarded against it.

He did not do so and we are enjoined to return a verdict of guilty of culpable homicide.

Verdict – Not guilty of murder but guilty of Culpable Homicide….,.

The conduct of some of our traditional healers and self proclaimed profits has not escaped our attention. So much confusion and hatred are sometimes as a result of the conduct of such traditional healers.

Murder re: Culpable Homicide iro Violent Conduct, Exceeding Limits of Self Defence and the Eye for an Eye Doctrine

On 6 April 2008, the accused, who was 17 years old and in the company of his cousin, the late Trust Macharangwanda, approached the deceased and accused her of practicing witchcraft and being responsible for death and illnesses in the family.

The deceased, who was 69 years old, protested her innocence and suggested that the accusations required the presence of family elders. The result was a combined assault initiated by Trust Macharangwanda and joined in by the accused. The two randomly assaulted the deceased using two sticks leading to the subsequent death of the deceased.

The post mortem report compiled by Dr David Tarumbwa recorded that there were multiple bruises and abrasions on the deceased's body. The doctor also observed and recorded the deceased had sustained a fractured occipital skull which was depressed with massive haemorrhage. The doctor concluded that the cause of the deceased's death was the head injury caused by the assault perpetrated on her....,.

The viva voce evidence of Esinath Mwareka took us through how the assault itself was carried out. The accused also testified on the assault itself.

We are satisfied that despite some unconvincing aspects of her testimony, like her indifference in describing to the court's satisfaction the type of switch used by the accused, Esinath's version of events leading to the death of the deceased was quite credible. Her version was more revealing as opposed to the version given by the accused person which was characterised by rough edges.

We found it to have been quite revealing and significant that the accused's version of what transpired, as explained by him in court, almost three (3) years after the event, was at variance with his summary of events given on 26 April 2008 at Mukurasine Police Station and subsequently confirmed at Chiredzi Court on 26 June 2008. We are satisfied his explanation in Court was calculated to mislead the Court and therefore we had no hesitation in rejecting it.

From the agreed evidence, the prosecution advocated for the accused to be found guilty of the crime of murder with constructive intent whilst the defence passionately argued that the evidence suggested no more than the commission of the crime of culpable homicide.

From a practical point there is a very thin line between murder with constructive intent and the offence of culpable homicide but the distinction must and has always been maintained.

For murder with constructive intent to be returned as a verdict the issue which must occupy the mind of the Court is whether, as a matter of inference deriving from the set of facts accepted by the Court, it can be said the accused foresaw that his conduct would result in the death of the deceased. An accused can only be convicted of murder if the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the facts proved is that the accused had legal intention to do so. The test becomes a subjective one. The Court is enjoined to take into account factual evidence which bears upon and could have affected the accused's perception, powers of judgment, and state of mind, deriving from such factors like the level of the accused's intelligence, age of the accused person, personality etc - the list is endless.

If the Court concludes that the accused could not have foreseen the possibility of death but that he should have foreseen it (relying on the reasonable man's test) and that a reasonable man would have guarded against it, the correct verdict must be culpable homicide.

It must be emphasised that in borderline cases, the Court must lean in favour of the verdict of culpable homicide and this approach appears to be influenced by the time-honoured and well cherished principle of our approach that the accused, as opposed to the State, must generally be granted the benefit of doubt.

It is never an easy walk.

In the instant case, the Court has had the benefit of seeing one of the sticks used. We have assessed the accused's level of intelligence, age at the time of the committing of the offence, and the fact that there is overwhelming evidence that the accused was not himself in control of the situation that led to the accused's tragic assault.

We are in agreement that it cannot be concluded, with a degree of certainty, that the accused could have foreseen that his involvement in the assault of the deceased would ultimately lead to the deceased's death.

However, it is our firm view that although the accused did not foresee death as a result of his conduct, a reasonable man placed in the shoes of the accused person would have foreseen that subjecting a sixty nine year old woman to the assault with the sticks or switches described to the Court would have resulted in her death and that the accused should have guarded against it.

He did not do so and we are enjoined to return a verdict of guilty of culpable homicide.

Verdict – Not guilty of murder but guilty of Culpable Homicide….,.

The conduct of some of our traditional healers and self proclaimed profits has not escaped our attention. So much confusion and hatred are sometimes as a result of the conduct of such traditional healers.

Sentencing re: Approach iro Approach to Sentencing, the Penalty Provision of a Statute and the Pre-Sentence Inquiry


There is no specific formula prescribed to the sentencing approach. It is a question of a value judgment borrowing heavily from a given set of facts as coloured by both the mitigating and aggravating factors. These must be carefully balanced to enable the Court to arrive at what it perceives to be an appropriate sentence.

Sentencing re: Murder iro Culpable Homicide (Violent Conduct)

Sentence

There is no specific formula prescribed to the sentencing approach. It is a question of a value judgment borrowing heavily from a given set of facts as coloured by both the mitigating and aggravating factors. These must be carefully balanced to enable the Court to arrive at what it perceives to be an appropriate sentence.

In sentencing the accused, the court accepts that he is a youthful first offender, 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the offence but now is 19 years old.

The accused did not himself mastermind the assault in question and was not in control of the proceedings leading to the assault of the deceased. He is being punished for joining in the assault that led to the death of the deceased.

It is also highly mitigatory that he took the initiative to dissuade his late cousin from continuing with the deceased's assault.

The accused's conduct led to the death of a close relative and we have no doubt this will probably haunt him for the rest of his life. That is some form of punishment.

We accept, in aggravation, that the accused demonstrated no respect at all by assaulting his aunt who was 69 years old at the time - and almost 52 years older than him.

The conduct exhibited by the accused was barbaric to say the least. The elders have invested so much in the youth and the youth are expected to demonstrate a reciprocal obligation by rendering maximum respect.

It is not the responsibility of young persons, like the accused, to mete out punishments on their parents but the inverse is true.

Whilst accepting the accused is a youthful first offender, our concern, as a court, is that it is these youth who are at the centre of committing these violent crimes in our society. The message must go loud and clear that this Court will not fold its hands and allow disorderly conduct out there.

The sentence imposed must send the message to other like-minded youth, and, at the same time, assist in the rehabilitation of the accused person.

It must be stated, and re-emphasized, that it is animals which quarrel and fight but people must find civilised methods of resolving their differences.

The conduct of some of our traditional healers and self proclaimed profits has not escaped our attention. So much confusion and hatred are sometimes as a result of the conduct of such traditional healers.

The issues which led to the death of the deceased should have been handled in a better way than the conduct resorted to by the accused person.

The accused is sentenced as follows:-

8 years imprisonment, 2 years of which is suspended for 5 years on condition the accused does not within this period commit any offence involving violence upon the person of another and for which upon conviction he will be sentenced to a term of imprisonment without the option of a fine.

Sentencing re: Approach iro Juvenile and Youthful Offenders, Juvenile Justice & Administration of Corporal Punishment


Sentence

There is no specific formula prescribed to the sentencing approach. It is a question of a value judgment borrowing heavily from a given set of facts as coloured by both the mitigating and aggravating factors. These must be carefully balanced to enable the Court to arrive at what it perceives to be an appropriate sentence.

In sentencing the accused, the court accepts that he is a youthful first offender, 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the offence but now is 19 years old.

The accused did not himself mastermind the assault in question and was not in control of the proceedings leading to the assault of the deceased. He is being punished for joining in the assault that led to the death of the deceased.

It is also highly mitigatory that he took the initiative to dissuade his late cousin from continuing with the deceased's assault.

The accused's conduct led to the death of a close relative and we have no doubt this will probably haunt him for the rest of his life. That is some form of punishment.

We accept, in aggravation, that the accused demonstrated no respect at all by assaulting his aunt who was 69 years old at the time - and almost 52 years older than him.

The conduct exhibited by the accused was barbaric to say the least. The elders have invested so much in the youth and the youth are expected to demonstrate a reciprocal obligation by rendering maximum respect.

It is not the responsibility of young persons, like the accused, to mete out punishments on their parents but the inverse is true.

Whilst accepting the accused is a youthful first offender, our concern, as a court, is that it is these youth who are at the centre of committing these violent crimes in our society. The message must go loud and clear that this Court will not fold its hands and allow disorderly conduct out there.

The sentence imposed must send the message to other like-minded youth, and, at the same time, assist in the rehabilitation of the accused person.

It must be stated, and re-emphasized, that it is animals which quarrel and fight but people must find civilised methods of resolving their differences.

The conduct of some of our traditional healers and self proclaimed profits has not escaped our attention. So much confusion and hatred are sometimes as a result of the conduct of such traditional healers.

The issues which led to the death of the deceased should have been handled in a better way than the conduct resorted to by the accused person.

The accused is sentenced as follows:-

8 years imprisonment, 2 years of which is suspended for 5 years on condition the accused does not within this period commit any offence involving violence upon the person of another and for which upon conviction he will be sentenced to a term of imprisonment without the option of a fine.

Expert Evidence, Opinion Evidence and Toolmark Evidence re: Approach and the Limited Expert Knowledge of the Court


The post mortem report compiled by Dr David Tarumbwa recorded that there were multiple bruises and abrasions on the deceased's body. 

The doctor also observed and recorded the deceased had sustained a fractured occipital skull which was depressed with massive haemorrhage. The doctor concluded that the cause of the deceased's death was the head injury caused by the assault perpetrated on her.

Direct and Circumstantial Evidence, Causation and Inferential Reasoning re: Key Witness, Eyewitness & Res Gestae


The viva voce evidence of Esinath Mwareka took us through how the assault itself was carried out. The accused also testified on the assault itself.

We are satisfied that despite some unconvincing aspects of her testimony, like her indifference in describing to the court's satisfaction the type of switch used by the accused, Esinath's version of events leading to the death of the deceased was quite credible. Her version was more revealing as opposed to the version given by the accused person which was characterised by rough edges.

Findings of Fact re: Witness Testimony, Candidness with the Court and Deceptive or Misleading Evidence


The viva voce evidence of Esinath Mwareka took us through how the assault itself was carried out. The accused also testified on the assault itself.

We are satisfied that despite some unconvincing aspects of her testimony, like her indifference in describing to the court's satisfaction the type of switch used by the accused, Esinath's version of events leading to the death of the deceased was quite credible. Her version was more revealing as opposed to the version given by the accused person which was characterised by rough edges.

Warned and Cautioned Statements, Indications, Evidence Aliunde & Presumption of Clarity of Events Nearer Date of Event


We found it to have been quite revealing and significant that the accused's version of what transpired, as explained by him in court, almost three (3) years after the event, was at variance with his summary of events given on 26 April 2008 at Mukurasine Police Station and subsequently confirmed at Chiredzi Court on 26 June 2008. 

We are satisfied his explanation in Court was calculated to mislead the Court and therefore we had no hesitation in rejecting it.

Defence Outline, State Outline re: Approach, Testimonial Discrepancies and Prevaricative or Inconsistent Evidence


We found it to have been quite revealing and significant that the accused's version of what transpired, as explained by him in court, almost three (3) years after the event, was at variance with his summary of events given on 26 April 2008 at Mukurasine Police Station and subsequently confirmed at Chiredzi Court on 26 June 2008. 

We are satisfied his explanation in Court was calculated to mislead the Court and therefore we had no hesitation in rejecting it.

Murder and Permissible or Competent Verdicts re: Approach, Intent, Motive, Corpse, Cause of Death & Inquest Proceedings


From a practical point there is a very thin line between murder with constructive intent and the offence of culpable homicide but the distinction must and has always been maintained.

For murder with constructive intent to be returned as a verdict the issue which must occupy the mind of the Court is whether, as a matter of inference deriving from the set of facts accepted by the Court, it can be said the accused foresaw that his conduct would result in the death of the deceased. An accused can only be convicted of murder if the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the facts proved is that the accused had legal intention to do so. The test becomes a subjective one. The Court is enjoined to take into account factual evidence which bears upon and could have affected the accused's perception, powers of judgment, and state of mind, deriving from such factors like the level of the accused's intelligence, age of the accused person, personality etc - the list is endless.

If the Court concludes that the accused could not have foreseen the possibility of death but that he should have foreseen it (relying on the reasonable man's test) and that a reasonable man would have guarded against it, the correct verdict must be culpable homicide.

It must be emphasised that in borderline cases, the Court must lean in favour of the verdict of culpable homicide and this approach appears to be influenced by the time-honoured and well cherished principle of our approach that the accused, as opposed to the State, must generally be granted the benefit of doubt.

It is never an easy walk.

Physical Evidence re: Approach


The Court has had the benefit of seeing one of the sticks used.

Onus, Burden and Standard of Proof re: Evidential Standard and Burden of Proof iro Factual Issues in Doubt


From a practical point there is a very thin line between murder with constructive intent and the offence of culpable homicide but the distinction must and has always been maintained.

For murder with constructive intent to be returned as a verdict the issue which must occupy the mind of the Court is whether, as a matter of inference deriving from the set of facts accepted by the Court, it can be said the accused foresaw that his conduct would result in the death of the deceased. An accused can only be convicted of murder if the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the facts proved is that the accused had legal intention to do so. The test becomes a subjective one. The Court is enjoined to take into account factual evidence which bears upon and could have affected the accused's perception, powers of judgment, and state of mind, deriving from such factors like the level of the accused's intelligence, age of the accused person, personality etc - the list is endless.

If the Court concludes that the accused could not have foreseen the possibility of death but that he should have foreseen it (relying on the reasonable man's test) and that a reasonable man would have guarded against it, the correct verdict must be culpable homicide.

It must be emphasised that in borderline cases, the Court must lean in favour of the verdict of culpable homicide and this approach appears to be influenced by the time-honoured and well cherished principle of our approach that the accused, as opposed to the State, must generally be granted the benefit of doubt.

It is never an easy walk.

Criminal Trial

On 6 April 2008 the accused who was 17 years old and in the company of his cousin the late Trust Macharangwanda approached the deceased and accused her of practicing witchcraft and being responsible for death and illnesses in the family.

The deceased, who was 69 years old, protested her innocence and suggested that the accusations required the presence of family elders. The result was a combined assault initiated by Trust and joined in by the accused. The two randomly assaulted the deceased using two sticks leading to the subsequent death of the deceased.

The post mortem report compiled by Dr David Tarumbwa recorded that there were multiple bruises and abrasions on the deceased's body. The doctor also observed and recorded the deceased had sustained a fractured occipital skull which was depressed with massive haemorrhage. The doctor concluded that the cause of the deceased's death was the head injury caused by the assault perpetrated on her.

The State alleged the accused was partly to blame because of his involvement in the tragic assault and in doing so they relied on the doctrine of common purpose.

Whilst agreeing to having taken part in assaulting the deceased the accused raised the defence of compulsion which was basically an averment by the accused that he had been compelled or forced to commit the assault by the late Trust who was older than him and assumed control of the proceedings leading to the assault and subsequent death of the deceased.

The basic requirements of the defence of compulsion has been eloquently stated and unanimously agreed by both counsel and it is not my intention to re-state it. Suffice it to say that it basically requires that for it to succeed evidence must abound to demonstrate in very clear terms that the crime in issue was induced by real and substantial threat and not cosmetic threats. Committing the crime in issue must have been the only avenue open to the accused in the given circumstances. The evidence must also show very clearly that the accused could not reasonably have been expected to have avoided the crime.

Authorities are in agreement that this defence will not avail itself to someone who voluntarily joins in advancing a criminal objective.

Having carefully weighed the requirements of the defence of compulsion both the State and the defence concluded the defence of compulsion was not sustainable in this case. We entirely agree with counsels' reading of the evidence presented and the conclusion arrived at. The issue of compulsion is accordingly put to rest.

The viva voce evidence of Esinath Mwareka took us through how the assault itself was carried out. The accused also testified on the assault itself.

We are satisfied that despite some unconvincing aspects of her testimony like her indifference in describing to the court's satisfaction the type of switch used by the accused, Esinath's version of events leading to the death of the deceased was quite credible. Her version was more revealing as opposed to the version given by the accused person which was characterised by rough edges.

We found it to have been quite revealing and significant that the accused's version of what transpired as explained by him in court almost 3 years after the event was at variance with his summary of events given on 26 April 2008 at Mukurasine Police Station and subsequently confirmed at Chiredzi Court on 26 June 2008. We are satisfied his explanation in Court was calculated to mislead the Court and therefore we had no hesitation in rejecting it.

From the agreed evidence, the prosecution advocated for the accused to be found guilty of the crime of murder with construction intent whilst the defence passionately argued that the evidence suggested no more than the commission of the crime of culpable homicide.

From a practical point there is a very thin line between murder with construction intent and the offence of culpable homicide but the distinction must and has always been maintained.

For murder with constructive intent to be returned as a verdict the issue which must occupy the mind of the Court is whether as a matter of inference deriving from the set of facts accepted by the Court it can be said the accused foresaw that his conduct would result in the death of the deceased. An accused can only be convicted of murder if the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the facts proved is that the accused had legal intention to do so. The test becomes a subjective one. The Court is enjoined to take into account factual evidence which bears upon and could have affected the accused's perception, powers of judgment and state of mind deriving from such factors like level of accused's intelligence, age of the accused person, personality etc - the list is endless.

If the Court concludes that the accused could not have foreseen the possibility of death but that he should have foreseen it (relying on reasonable man's test) and that a reasonable man would have guarded against it, the correct verdict must be culpable homicide.

It must be emphasised that in borderline cases the Court must lean in favour of the verdict of culpable homicide and this approach appears to be influenced by the time honoured and well cherished principle of our approach that the accused as opposed to the State must generally be granted the benefit of doubt.

It is never an easy walk.

In the instant case the Court has had the benefit of seeing one of the sticks used. We have assessed the accused's level of intelligence, age at the time of the committing of the offence and the fact that there is overwhelming evidence that the accused was not himself in control of the situation that led to the accused's tragic assault.

We are in agreement that it cannot be concluded with a degree of certainty that the accused could have foreseen that his involvement in the assault of the deceased would ultimately lead to the deceased's death.

However it is our firm view that although the accused did not foresee death as a result of his conduct, a reasonable man placed in the shoes of the accused person would have foreseen that subjecting a sixty nine year old woman to the assault with the sticks or switches described to the Court would have resulted in her death and that the accused should have guarded against it. He did not do so and we are enjoined to return a verdict of guilty of culpable homicide.

Verdict – Not guilty of murder but guilty of Culpable Homicide.

Sentence

There is no specific formula prescribed to the sentencing approach. It is a question of a value judgment borrowing heavily from a given set of facts as coloured by both the mitigating and aggravating factors. These must be carefully balanced to enable the Court to arrive at what it perceives to be an appropriate sentence.

In sentencing the accused the court accepts that he is a youthful first offender, 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the offence but now is 19 years old.

The accused did not himself mastermind the assault in question and was not in control of the proceedings leading to the assault of the deceased. He is being punished for joining in the assault that led to the death of the deceased.

It is also highly mitigatory that he took the initiative to dissuade his late cousin from continuing with the deceased's assault.

The accused's conduct led to the death of a close relative and we have no doubt this will probably haunt him for the rest of his life. That is some form of punishment.

We accept in aggravation that the accused demonstrated no respect at all by assaulting his aunt who was 69 years old at the time and almost 52 years older than him.

The conduct exhibited by the accused was barbaric to say the least. The elders have invested so much in the youth and the youth are expected to demonstrate a reciprocal obligation by rendering maximum respect.

It is not the responsibility of young persons like the accused to mete out punishments on their parents but the inverse is true.

Whilst accepting the accused is a youthful first offender, our concern as a court is that it is these youth who are at the centre of committing these violent crimes in our society. The message must go loud and clear that this Court will not fold its hands and allow disorderly conduct out there.

The sentence imposed must send the message to other like minded youth and at the same time assist in the rehabilitation of the accused person.

It must be stated and re-emphasized that it is animals which quarrel and fight but people must find civilised methods of resolving their differences.

The conduct of some of our traditional healers and self proclaimed profits has not escaped our attention. So much confusion and hatred are sometimes as a result of the conduct of such traditional healers.

The issues which led to the death of the deceased should have been handled in a better way than the conduct resorted to by the accused person.

The accused is sentenced as follows:-

8 years imprisonment, 2 years of which is suspended for 5 years on condition the accused does not within this period commit any offence involving violence upon the person of another and for which upon conviction he will be sentenced to a term of imprisonment without the option of a fine.






Attorney General's Office, for the State

Muzenda & Partners, for defence counsel

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